

**T.C.  
ISTANBUL GEDİK UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**PEACE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE HORN OF  
AFRICA (2000-2023)**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**Djama Said DJAMA**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations**

**Political Science and International Relations Master's Program in English**

**JULY 2024  
ISTANBUL**

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**Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Selim SEZER**

**Istanbul 2024**



T.C.  
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Bu çalışma 18.07.2024 tarihinde aşağıdaki jüri tarafından Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler İngilizce (Tezli Yüksek Lisans) Programı Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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## **DECLARATION**

In order to receive the Master of Political Science and International Relations with thesis award, I, Djama Said Djama, thus attest that this thesis is my original work. I completed this dissertation at the university's Political Science and International Relations Department. This research has not been and will not be submitted to any university in the future for consideration for a degree award of any kind. (22707/2024)

Djama Said DJAMA



*To my beloved Mother and Father,*



## **DEDICATION**

Mom, your loving spirit, and limitless patience have always given me energy. Your constant messages of advice and soft suggestions inspired me to keep striving for perfection, reminding me that every problem presents a chance for progress. Dad, your unwavering tenacity, and perseverance have motivated me to endure even in the most difficult of situations. Your calm fortitude and continuous support have been the foundation of my goals, demonstrating that everything is achievable with hard work and determination.

You have formed the person I am today. This thesis is a testament to your unending love and faith in me. Many thanks for always being my pillar of strength, my source of motivation, and my biggest supporter.

## **FOREWORD**

As I prepare to give this thesis on the complex dynamics of peace and security concerns in the Horn of Africa, I found myself pondering the remarkable journey that has brought me to this point. The Horn of Africa, an area packed with history, culture, and variety, is nevertheless plagued by complicated wars and security issues that have existed for decades. This effort is more than just an academic undertaking; it demonstrates the ongoing attempt to comprehend and resolve the region's diverse difficulties. It investigates the underlying causes of violence, the dynamics of peacebuilding, and the complex interaction of political, economic, and social forces that define the conditions of peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

During this experience, I was lucky to be mentored by Dr. Selim Sezer, who freely offered his thoughts and experience. His advice has been crucial in developing my perspective and strategy for this complicated issue.

I am also very grateful to the people of the Horn of Africa, whose perseverance in the face of tragedy serves as a daily reminder of the significance of our study. Their tales, difficulties, and goals have fuelled my commitment to focus on the issues they face and push for long-term solutions that foster stability, prosperity, and security.

As I present my dissertation to the academic community and beyond, my goal is to help further our awareness of the complexity of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. May it serve as an outlet for debate thought, and actions, encouraging fresh efforts to create a more harmonious and safe future for everyone who lives in this region.

With sincerity and commitment,

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AFRICOM</b>	: The United States Africa Command
<b>AMISOM</b>	: African Union Mission to Somalia
<b>AU</b>	: African Union
<b>CJTF-HOA</b>	: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
<b>ELF</b>	: Eritrean Liberation Front
<b>ENDF</b>	: Ethiopian National Defence Forces
<b>EPLF</b>	: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
<b>EPRDF</b>	: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
<b>EU</b>	: European Union
<b>GCC</b>	: Gulf Cooperation Council
<b>GDP</b>	: Gross Domestic Product
<b>ICC-PRC</b>	: International Chamber of Commerce’s Piracy Reporting Center
<b>ICRHEE</b>	: International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia
<b>IGAD</b>	: Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the Horn of Africa
<b>IMO</b>	: International Maritime Organization
<b>OAU</b>	: Organization of African Unity
<b>OCHA</b>	: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>OEF—HOA</b>	: Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa
<b>ONLF</b>	: Ogaden National Liberation Front
<b>PFDJ</b>	: People’s Front for Democracy and Justice
<b>PLO</b>	: Palestine Liberation Organization
<b>TDF</b>	: Tigray Defence Forces
<b>TPLF</b>	: Tigray People’s Liberation Front
<b>UN</b>	: United Nations
<b>UNSAID</b>	: Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
<b>UNSOM</b>	: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
<b>WFP</b>	: World Food Program

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## **PEACE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE HORN AFRICA (2000-2023)**

### **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the multifaceted peace and security challenges that have plagued the Horn of Africa from 2000 to 2023. This region's socio-political environment has been significantly altered by ongoing conflicts, shaky peace deals, and geopolitical rivalry over more than 20 years. In fact, what is the primary cause of the threats to security and peace in the Horn of Africa? We suppose that terror organizations and different ethnic groups are seen as the main insecurity factor in Africa. Therefore, this research aims to identify the fundamental reasons and intricate interactions that have impeded sustained peace and development by a thorough examination of historical occurrences, regional dynamics, and international initiatives. Through an examination of case studies such as the boundary dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Somali Civil War, and the involvement of non-state actors, this thesis offers significant perspectives on the complex process of resolving conflicts and the difficulties of upholding stability in a turbulent geopolitical landscape. Additionally, it assesses how well local peacebuilding efforts, outside interventions, and regional organizations work to solve these enduring issues. The ultimate goal of this research is to further our understanding of the Horn of Africa's struggle to maintain security and peace in the face of persistent regional complexity.

**Keywords:** *Conflict, Terrorism, Ethnic Tensions*

## AFRİKA BOYNUZU'NDA BARIŞ VE GÜVENLİK SORUNLARI (2000-2023)

### ÖZET

Bu tez, 2000'den 2023'e kadar Afrika Boynuzu'nu rahatsız eden çok yönlü barış ve güvenlik sorunlarını incelemektedir. Bu bölgenin sosyo-politik ortamı, 20 yılı aşkın süredir devam eden çatışmalar, kırılğan barış anlaşmaları ve jeopolitik rekabet nedeniyle önemli ölçüde değişmiştir. Peki, Afrika Boynuzu'nda güvenlik ve barışa yönelik tehditlerin temel nedeni nedir? Burada terör örgütleri ve farklı etnik grupların Afrika'daki ana güvensizlik faktörü olarak görüldüğünü düşünüyoruz. Bu nedenle bu araştırma, tarihsel olayların, bölgesel dinamiklerin ve uluslararası girişimlerin kapsamlı şekilde incelenmesi yoluyla sürdürülebilir barış ve kalkınmayı engelleyen temel nedenleri ve karmaşık etkileşimleri tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Eritre ve Etiyopya arasındaki sınır anlaşmazlığı, Somali İç Savaşı ve devlet dışı aktörlerin katılımı gibi örnek olayların incelenmesi yoluyla bu tez, çatışmaları çözmenin karmaşık süreci ve çalkantılı bir jeopolitik ortamda istikrarı korumanın zorlukları hakkında kayda değer perspektifler sunmaktadır. Ayrıca, yerel barış inşası çabalarının, dış müdahalelerin ve bölgesel örgütlerin bu kalıcı sorunları çözmek için ne derece iyi çalıştığını değerlendirmektedir. Bu araştırmanın nihai amacı, Afrika Boynuzu'nun süregelen bölgesel karmaşa karşısında güvenlik ve barışı koruma mücadelesini daha iyi anlamamızı sağlamaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Çatışma, Terörizm, Etnik Gerilimler*

# **1. INTRODUCTION**

## **1.1 Study Topic**

The Horn of Africa is the focal point of continental cooperation, peace, and security initiatives and the location of the African Union's headquarters. It is also the home of thousands of different ethnic groups living together. However, the region confronts significant threats to state and human security brought on by armed conflict between clans and between government forces against terror organizations, political unrest, a lack of democracy, and poor governance. Although some security cooperations exist, it does not act actively to bring peace. Also, States in the region have competing hegemonic goals.

## **1.2 Purpose of Thesis**

This thesis aims to thoroughly investigate the peace and security difficulties in the Horn of Africa, an area marked by significant sociopolitical processes, historical conflicts, and foreign concerns. It aims to identify the core reasons and historical roots of war in the Horn of Africa, taking into account ethnic conflicts, disputes over borders, resource constraints, and the legacy of colonialism.

## **1.3 Objectives**

Using Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya as a case study, the topic seeks to examine the peace and security issues in the Horn of Africa. Therefore the principal goals consist of:

- Analyzing the ways in which insecurity both inside and outside of Somalia's borders has been exacerbated by state failure.
- Clarifying the main challenging factors of peace in the region.
- Assessing international responses to these challenges, such as military interventions and peacekeeping missions.

- Discussing the broader implications for peace and security in the Horn of Africa region, including the role of neighboring countries and international organizations in addressing these issues.

#### **1.4 Literature Review**

The Horn of Africa has been plagued by ongoing hostilities, shaky political systems, and socioeconomic instability for many years. The purpose of this literature study is to examine the issues related to security and peace in the area between 2000 and 2023. It aims to shed light on the intricacies and dynamics of peace and security in the Horn of Africa throughout the last 20 years by examining academic publications, papers, and articles.

Scholarly publications, such as those by Mulugeta (2018), highlight the fact that historical grievances, colonial legacies, and ethno-political tensions are frequently the root causes of wars in the Horn of Africa.

The complexity of war in the Horn of Africa is the subject of Mulugeta's work, which emphasizes the influence of colonial legacies and past grievances on current conflicts. The author investigates how geopolitical concerns and outside actions worsen regional instability. Mulugeta contends that creating successful plans for conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the area requires an awareness of the historical background.

Therefore, we will examine ethno-political tensions and their impact on peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and we will discuss how ethnic identities and political dynamics intersect to fuel conflicts across the region which we couldn't find in Mulugeta's research.

- **Interstate Wars and Border Conflicts:**

De Waal's book covers the years 2000–2018 and focuses on the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. He offers a thorough examination of the political, social, and historical elements that contributed to the start and continuation of the conflict. De Waal looks at how nationalism, territorial claims, and outside factors shaped the nature of the conflict. In addition, he talks about the peace processes and mediation attempts used to end the conflict, providing perspectives on the difficulties and opportunities for peace in the Horn of Africa.

In fact, in this thesis, we will focus also on the Djibouti-Eritrea war in 2008 which occupies till now a critical role in the peace and security of the region.

- **Insurgencies and Internal Conflicts:**

Peace and security in Africa have been severely hampered by internal conflicts and insurgencies, with Somalia serving as a notable example. Studies by Menkhaus (2006) and Flint (2017) shed light on the intricacies of these disputes. They draw attention to the ways that internal factionalism, institutional failings at the state level, and outside interventions prolong instability and intensify hostilities. These studies add to a better understanding of the enduring difficulties confronting attempts to establish permanent peace in conflict-affected countries of the Horn of Africa and beyond by examining the complex processes at work.

In contrast, we will elaborate in detail on the Somali failed state and its consequences in the country and the regions. The Failed State has made serious security risks in the area as a result of the growth of terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab and its international networks in Somalia and Kenya. We will also discuss the beliefs of this terrorist organization. Extremism and terrorism pose significant security threats in the Horn of Africa, primarily due to the expansion of groups like Al-Shabaab and their international networks operating from Somalia.

### **1.5 Research Questions**

This research aims to investigate the primary factors that undermine peace and security in the Horn of Africa. It seeks to understand the extent to which populations in the region, both within their countries and across state borders, experience security and stability. Key questions include examining how factors like state fragility, internal conflicts, terrorist activities such as those perpetrated by groups like Al Shabab, and the impact of piracy contribute to insecurity. Additionally, the research will explore the effectiveness of regional and international efforts in mitigating these challenges and promoting stability in the Horn of Africa.

### **1.6 Hypothesis**

Foremost, having a terror organization and a different ethnic group is seen as the main insecurity factor in Africa; it has also been seen in the Balkans. I suppose

that with all these differences and terror organizations, achieving regional and national peace is nearly impossible.

As a result, in the first section, we shall go further into the ancient history of the Horn of Africa, beginning with establishing state structures. In the second section, we will talk about regional peace and security challenges. Finally, we will discuss policy recommendations.



## 2. THE ANCIENT HISTORY

Eastern Africa is a region of Africa that generally refers to the countries of the Great African Rift Valley. In eastern Africa, we also find the Horn of Africa, also known as Afrikah Gayssa in Afar, Geeska Afrika in Somali, የአፍሪካ ቀንድ in Amharic, ቀርኒ አፍሪቃ in Tigrinya, and الأفرقي القرن in Arabic, which is a peninsula in East Africa. It stretches from the Red Sea's southern coast to the Arabian Sea's western coast, passing through the Gulf of Aden. Its shape on a map resembles that of a rhinoceros horn. The term specifically refers to the region occupied by Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Due to its strategic location, it has been a focal point for various geopolitical issues. The Horn of Africa covers approximately two million square kilometers and has a population of 140,7 million, with Ethiopia having 112 million, Somalia having 10 million, Eritrea having 4 million, and Djibouti having 0.97 million inhabitants (Misachi, 2021).

The countries in the Horn of Africa are like the first Yugoslavia state (1918-1941) from the multi-community, multilingual, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic side. Several ethnic groups like Oromo, Somali, Afar, and Tigray, each of them having a different language but having a similar culture and words, co-habits in the Horn of Africa (Sorenson, 1992: 227-252). As the dominant religion is also Islam, there are some Arabic words used by all these ethnic groups. Each country in the Horn of Africa is a multicultural and multilingual state. For example, in Djibouti, there are four spoken languages: French as the official language, a different dialectical Somali language than the actual Somali language spoken in Somalia or Kenya, Afar, and Arabic language. Despite all these differences, their culture is similar in their food, clothes, and way of marriage. Islam is the only element that brings together beyond their multicultural and multilingual issues.

Despite its vastness, the land exhibits remarkable geographical homogeneity. It is a monotonous plateau that gradually slopes down from the highlands in the west and northwest towards the coastal lowlands. It is rarely covered in thornbushes.

The east of the region is covered by rocky and white sand coast and in the west a fertile land with one of the most significant rivers in the world (Nile River). However, the climate also differs in the region where the temperature can attain 45 degrees in the east in the summer. In that case, the eastern civilians travel to Ethiopia where they can find 17 degrees in the summer with a lower life cost than in the East (Djibouti).

Unfortunately, the history of Africa starts with slavery and colonization. It has been years that we have been asking ourselves, what was Africa before slavery, what was our motherland before the white men discovered Africa? How is it possible to not think about an ancestor's life? Therefore, a sentence inspired by the enormous book by P. K. Dick, which was very well received in France in 1970, tells us 'Les vainqueurs l'écrivent les vaincus racontent l'histoire' (Dick, 1962), that the winners write the history and the vanquished tells the story written by the winners. It is clear that colonization claimed that African history started in the 18th century, and they educated and civilized the black people who were in uncivilized poor communities. To clarify this, the only history taught in the author's country (Djibouti) is three chapters of Djibouti's history in the period of colonization in high school. These three chapters talk about how we were colonized and how we obtained colonization. And the start of the colonization on the Red Sea Coast.

However, there are some Eastern African monarchs in the 15th centuries, like the Merina monarch in Madagascar and the Ashanti Kingdom of Ghana. Unfortunately, these realms were invaded by the Britain and France. Due to the occupation and the new civilization that the colonizers were teaching them, the Africans lost their precious identity and their unique civilizations. As my grandfather recited in an interview, 'The daily African life was immensely struggling. The adults go with the sheep every morning, and the women stay home as midwives to cook and sweep the floor. The work area was going with the sheep, farming for those who lived in fertile soil, and fishing' (Hared, 2005). Even so, the farming and fishing methods were different from today's farming and fishing methods. Ancient people used camels and donkeys to travel and transport their goods.

One of the most important trade technics was the caravan, transporting salt from Djibouti to Ethiopia by exchanging the salt against fruits and vegetables.



**Figure 2.1: Robert Harding. Salt caravan in Djibouti, Going from Assal Lake to Ethiopian Mountains, Djibouti, Africa. Published on Masterlife Studio**

**Source:** <https://www.masterfile.com/image/fr/841-07202402>, accessed on September 08, 2023.

The image shows that the caravan technique of trade still exists in the region, even though the region has many ports. The nomads still use this technique because they live far away from the city, and the government does not initiate any kind of cargo that can satisfy the nomad's needs. In this image, we can see a man pulling five camels, carrying on their back some kilos of salt and food for the camel drivers. The nomads use the camels as trade cargo because camels can fast for longer days than any other species (Hared, 2005). It is like a car shipment. It is well known that camels can go for extended periods without drinking water. This capacity varies throughout breeds and is impacted by weather conditions, the kind and amount of feed, as well as the water content, the animal's age, and the kind of labor it performs.

The vegetation is frequently very wet during the rainy season, and camels can also find surface water in natural dams. In the Sahara, camels may survive without water for up to six months throughout the winter and fantastic season. Even when given water, they refuse to drink it. There is adequate moisture in the feed to meet maintenance and productivity needs. Every six to ten days during the dry season, camels are brought to water when the grasses have dried up. They may go more than a month without water in arid conditions. Camels can survive without water for 10 to 15 days when the mean temperature in the Sahara and the Sahel reaches 30 to 35°C. However, shorter intervals between waterings are required when the temperature

rises beyond 40°C (Bornstein, 1990: S-750-07). For most of Africa, this kind of trade had been used before the arrival of the White men on the continent. Despite diversified tribes and languages, the citizens lived without borderlines, traveling according to the seasons, such as going to the south in the winter to find warmth and returning to the north in summer. It is called *Reer Guura* in Somali.

The ancient history of Africa is characterized by the so-called *Reer Guura* (Nomadic Life). We can find most nomads in Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa, like the Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. We can also find Afar living in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The Oromo are living in Ethiopia and Eritrea. If we classify, these tribes in terms of lifestyle, the Somali and Afar are shepherds, whereas the Oromo are farmers. However, their life depends on the animals, which causes them to be wherever the animals can get water and grass (Mahamed, 2020: 3-5). Moving from one city to another because there were no borders or limited places that could stop them. This is the main reason that in the Horn of Africa, it is possible to find any tribes in any country of the region.

## **2.1 Colonization and Decolonization in the Horn of Africa (19<sup>th</sup> Centuries)**

After the first conquest of Sultan Selim I in Egypt, the Horn of Africa attracted the Ottoman rulers, and they pushed their conquest without hesitation to the region. The year 1538 marks the beginning of the naval expeditions launched by Suleiman the Magnificent (1494-1566) against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean (Orhonlu,1996: 363-367). The Sultan relies on Özdemiş Pasha, a Mamluk officer, who conquers both banks of the Bab El-Mandeb Strait. In 1557, after occupying the post of governor of Yemen, he set out to conquer the ports of Massawa and Souakin on the Red Sea. It was at this time that the new province of Habesh, comprising parts of Eritrea, Djibouti, and current Somali, was created. From 1517 to 1556, the Ottoman Empire occupied the coast of East Africa by creating the Habesh province with four coastal villages: Souakin, Massawa, Harrar, and Zeyla (Mohamed, 2016: 96-98).

### **2.1.1 Ethiopia conquest to war (1896)**

The actual Ethiopian Federal state was already a vast Kingdom starting from the creation of the Zagwe dynasty. Based on Ethiopian sources, most of which date to the late fifteenth century, the Zagwe Dynasty started around the first half of the eleventh century (Muehlbauer, 2023: 127-152). Governed by Mara Takla, the leadership went from father to son till the failure of the Zagwe dynasty in the eleventh century. The dynasty was also occupying the actual Eritrea. In 1270, Yekuno Amlak founded the Solomonic dynasty, which was the most prominent Christian dynasty in East Africa. This dynasty was trading enslaved people brought from areas they occupied with Britain and the Portuguese.

During the second half of the 19th century, a large part of Africa was already conquered by specific European colonialists such as Germany, France, Portugal, and many others. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 allowed ships to reach East Africa without the need to pass around all of Africa. The Horn of Africa represented a strategic region for these imperialist countries and attracted all kinds of colonial lust. Like its neighbors, the Kingdom of Italy, which had just achieved unity in 1871, also tried to possess territories in East Africa. Italy established a colony in East Africa precisely in Eritrea, in 1869 with the arrival of Giuseppe Sopedes to make a service port for the Italian ships. Italy signed a friendly peace treaty with Ethiopia on May 2, 1889.

The two versions of the treaty, one in Amharic and the other in Italian differ in their translation (Sven, 1964: 243-247). While the Amharic version indicates that Emperor Menelik can if he wishes, request the services of Italy for the conduct of all the affairs he may have with other powers, the Italian version makes him the obligation to place Ethiopia under an Italian protectorate (MS, 1889). Menelik became aware of this manipulation only in December 1889. After following one of the requests with the German and English governments, which replied that they could not accept direct communications from Ethiopia and that Ethiopia is under Italian protectorate. On September 22, 1890, the Ethiopian monarch issued a letter to King Umberto I, denouncing the deception and ending all contact between the two nations (Hess, 1973: 94-109). He also sent to the European countries that Ethiopia rejected any form of protectorate. The Italians no longer saw any other solution than military conquest.

So, in January 1895, the Italian colonist army engaged in a battle with the Ethiopians in the Tigre region, which was known as the Battle of Coati. Italy emerged victorious in the battle and occupied a large part of the region (Battle of Coatit: 2018). The emperor imported a large quantity of firearms and mobilized all his soldiers against Italy. After several months of war, in January 1896, the Ethiopian emperor decided successively to regroup soldiers in several cities of the country and launch an offensive. In May 1896, the battle of Adoua ended with the death of two Italian commanders, Eduardo and Umberto Massote, and the Italian soldiers were captured and imprisoned. On March 10, 1896, after political crises in Italy, Francesco Crispy resigned from his post as prime minister, and his government was replaced by another, which abandoned any project of colonial expansion (Hess,1973: 110). Following the Ethiopian victory, the Treaty of Addis Ababa was signed between the Ethiopian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy, this time written in Amharic and French. This treaty recognized the independence of Ethiopia and ensured the end of Italian colonial ambitions in Ethiopia.

### **2.1.2 Renaissance of the occupation (imperialism) in Ethiopia (1936-1941)**

During Mussolini's rule, a new era of diplomatic relation between Italy and Ethiopia emerged, driven by strategic interests. Italy's Vatican sought to encourage Italian Catholic migration to counter the spread of Protestantism and halt Islam's influence in Ethiopia. Conversely, Ethiopia's viceroy perceived Italian colonization as a means to elevate civilization and enhance productivity in what was considered a dormant territory, despite the region's existing robust agricultural output.

Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of the Italian government's development into Ethiopia, like that of all other colonialist powers, was first to supply Ethiopia's economic and personnel needs, which was to have enough soldiers in East Africa to protect the region from potential French or British invasion (Alberto, 1977: 503-516). However, Mussolini, a farming family descendant, thought that urbanism was the root of all social and political ills in contemporary society. He believed returning to rural life would significantly increase the Italian population since farmers were perceived as more respectable and because nomads were more straightforward to manage and integrate into the fascist state. The commitment made by the Italians to the Ethiopians was to improve their quality of life, develop their agriculture by

increasing production and exporting to other nations, facilitate Italian penetration among Ethiopians, and expand Italian influence throughout the nation.

However, it was more important to provide housing for Italian immigrants in Ethiopia. According to sources, the new occupation of Ethiopia by the Italians was carried out to relieve population worries in Italy (Hess,1973: 505). The Italian government intended to reduce the Italian's desire for their own by emulating the environment they left behind to persuade them to travel to Ethiopia. Italy became interested in three seas (the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean) when Ethiopia, the new home of many Italians, widened the Italian peninsula. It was anticipated that Italian immigration to Ethiopia would reduce the flow of skilled labor to other countries and end unemployment by allowing them to take on director roles in Ethiopia's newly established agricultural industry. Instead of working as day laborers, which is a job exclusively for Ethiopians, Italians in Ethiopia would own farms and oversee Ethiopian laborer's labor. Italy wanted to establish a society, where the Italian people owned land in order to raise their social standing and their desire to go to Ethiopia.

The information given allows for several conclusions to be reached. One must examine the Italian Ethiopian in terms of the business connection and the acts of Italians in Ethiopia much more closely. Ucciali must be interpreted partially in terms of Crispi's protectorate and partially in other ways. Moreover, the Battle of Adowa did not mark the end of Italian interest in Ethiopia (Hess, 1973: 108). There were some positive aspects, from Menelik's Ethiopian point of view to retaining the defeated Italians as good neighbors. The evidence points in the direction of the commercial relationship and the value of Italian-controlled Eritrea as an outlet for Ethiopian trade and not solely as a means of restricting the power of the feudal chief.

### **2.1.3 Djibouti under French colonialism (1862-1977)**

*La Côte française des Somalis* (The French Somali Coast), then known as *Territoire Français des Afars et des Issas* (French territory of Afars and Issas), was the first two name of Djibouti named by Leance Lagarde, a French colonial official and diplomat (Imbert-Vier, 2013: 123-150). Leance Lagarde was the commander of Obock and was later named the governor of the French Somali Coast. In 1883, Leance Lagarde discovered a coastal village named Obock. At that time, Obock was

a small coastal village where the Afar community lived with their Sultan. After several months of expedition, Lagarde and the Sultan agreed to loan their port to the French government. Suddenly, the agreement changed into colonialism.

When Leance Lagarde was appointed governor of the colony of Obock in 1884, Obock was merely a nomadic community of pastoralists from the Afar region. In this strategically important port, where steamships could resupply themselves with coal, water, and a sufficiently known location to sailor diviners (Mohamed, 2016: 98). With an excellent diplomatic strategy, Lagarde established France on the Tadjourah Gulf's perimeter between 1884 and 1888. Firstly, he signed a series of treaties with the chiefs of the area and restored normal relations with his neighbors. Secondly, he developed a close relationship with the king of Chao, who would later become Menelik II, the Emperor of Ethiopia, and lusted after the Zeila-Harar trade route.

However, the scorching temperatures and lack of agriculture hindered the first urban settlement. Obock was no longer the starting point of a caravan trail, and the affluent markets of Choa eluded European traders. It was not also the longer technical and strategic stopover that the French fleet demanded to compete with the port of Aden to the extent that the rare and excessively salty water eroded the boilers and the spleen remained challenging to access (Mohamed, 2016: 102). So, Leance Lagarde searched for a better location to relocate administrative and financial services.

In 1888, France settled in Djibouti, which offered better prospects, and made aware by Lagarde of the possibilities of development of the territory, the French government, by the decree of May 20, 1896, set up the French Somali Coast for capital Djibouti. The colony's development shifts from north to south of the Gulf of Tadjourah in Somali territory. The territory is divided into four provinces: Djibouti, Ali Sabieh, Dikhil, and Tadjourah. Therefore, Djibouti, the administrative capital of the colony, concentrates all economic functions.

The capital's port became the stopover for ships serving the French empire, particularly maritime couriers. Lagarde revived the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 1839 to drain Ethiopia's exports and found a more receptive partner (Menelik II), as his now enslaved country depended on the Europeans who colonized the coast. Thus, by the convention of March 9, 1894, the emperor granted the

Imperial Ethiopian Railway Company the right to build a track linking Djibouti to the Ethiopian Nile. France accepted that the railway line crosses the French Somali Coast. As a result, in 1898, a vast construction site opened, attracting an international workforce (Italian supervisors and Greek engineers, French engineers, and Yemeni and Somali laborers). Despite enormous difficulties, the 311-kilometer railway line, a third of which was on the French Somali Coast, came into service on January 1, 1903. In a few years, the population of Djibouti increased from around 7,000 inhabitants to nearly 13,000 inhabitants. The port of Djibouti surpassed the port of Zeila, which had long been the main port of the region (Imbert-Vier, 2008: 86-88).

After the siege colonization of Djibouti, the French government started educating the people in Djibouti. It started controlling the borders by issuing an identity card for those who claimed the territory (Hared, 2005). So, the problem started here; whereas the nomads usually traveled without any restrictions, the installations of the French colonialist army in Djibouti started a new way of life with a restricted border. For example, when the border restrictions started, some families were outside of the territories searching for a place where their animals could get food and water. Those families encountered difficulties entering the territory again, even if they had tiny houses in the Djiboutian territories. The border restriction caused some displacement, and on the other hand, with the urbanization of the territory, the population started to grow. At that time, the capital was divided into two parts: the north, called Place Arthur Rambaud, was where the colonialist army of France and some Djiboutian workers were living, and the south, where nomads were staying. After the emancipation of the decolonization, the community started to grow, and feeling of decolonization started to emerge in the territory with the help of the Somali Federal state under Ziyad Barih, who was a nationalist, who wanted to unify all Somali territories under one country.

Nevertheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, Djiboutian nationalist movements began demanding independence for the colony (Shilling, 1973: 618). These movements were supported by local figures such as Hassan Gouled Aptidon and Ahmed Dini.

In 1967, the Popular Rally for Progress (*Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progres*), a political party led by Hassan Gouled Aptidon, was created; this party played a central role in the independence process. In 1977, a referendum was held to

allow Djiboutians to decide their political future. It is known as the yes or no vote; the people who wanted colonization to continue had to say no for independence, whereas the nationalists had to say yes for independence. The majority voted in favor of independence. On June 27, 1977, Djibouti became independent, ending French colonization. The international community quickly recognized Djibouti as a sovereign state. Following the independence, Hassan Gouled Aptidon became the first president of the Republic of Djibouti, and Ahmed Dini became the first Djiboutian prime minister.

However, after independence, Djibouti faced many challenges, including building democratic institutions and economic development. France has been the official regulator of law and democracy in Djibouti, the country has experienced periods of political stability as well as periods of tension and conflict. The country has seen elections and political transitions over the years. Thus, the decolonization of Djibouti was a gradual process that led to the country's independence in 1977, ending more than a century of French colonial rule.

#### **2.1.4 Eritrea toward independence**

Eritrea is a country in the Horn of Africa with a long and rich history. Eritrea's name comes from the Greek word for "red", which refers to the Red Sea that borders the country. The Ottoman Empire first discovered Eritrea, as mentioned in the previous section. It is the Habes State conquered by Özdemiş Pasha in 1538 at the beginning of the naval expeditions launched by Suleiman the Magnificent (1494-1566) (Orhonlu,1996: 363-367). In the last decades of the 16th century, the coalition of the Ethiopian kingdom and Portuguese conquered the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, the leaders of this coalition could not agree to share the occupation between them. From that time till the Berlin treaty Eritrea was a territory without a state. With the treaty of Berlin (1884-1885), Eritrea came under occupation and colonization of Italy, joining Ethiopia and Somalia to form Italian East Africa. Up until 1941, Italy ruled Eritrea.

This colonization was meant to bring civilization, in the form of Christianity, and trade (Berlin Conference, 1884-1885). From 1882 to 1941, the Italian government began its first expansion initiatives in the newly founded colony in 1888 AD. The Eritrean railroad was opened in Saati in 1888 and reached the mountainous

city of Asmara in 1911. In its day, the Asmara–Massawa cable car was the longest railroad line in the world; however, the British dismantled it during the Second World War. In addition to large-scale infrastructure projects, the colonial authorities also invested heavily in agriculture. It also recruited large numbers of Eritreans into the civil service, particularly in the police and public works departments, and provided urban facilities in Massawa and Asmara. Thousands of Eritreans joined the army and fought in the Second and First Italo-Abyssinian Wars and the Italo-Turkish War in Libya (Fernandez, 2021).

Additionally, Desidero Fernandez noted in his article that “the Italian government established several new factories in Eritrea that produce a variety of household goods including pasta, tobacco, cooking oil, buttons, building materials, packaged meat, and hides. The majority of the workers in the nearly 2,198 factories in 1939 AD were native Eritreans. The development of industries also facilitated the influx of Italians and Eritreans into the cities. The local Italian population grew from 4,600 to 75,000 in just five years. Fruit growing and trade spread throughout the nation due to Eritreans' industrial involvement, and some farms were owned by them” (Fernandez, 2021).

With the defeat of Italy in the Second World War, the British defeated the Italian forces in Asmara. Therefore, a UN resolution giving Eritrea autonomy within the Ethiopian empire led to the federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1952. However, in 1962, the federation ended as Ethiopia annexed Eritrea and did away with its parliament, flag, and constitution. This set off an independence war that lasted thirty years, during which Eritrean rebels battled Ethiopian forces and their allies.

Eritrea officially became an independent state in 1993, after a referendum that the United Nations supervised. Ethiopia and the international community recognized Eritrea’s independence. Eritrea adopted a new constitution, flag, and anthem and established a multi-party system.

Their most significant victory was that they gained all their coastal territory, making the Ethiopian kingdom a country without access to the sea. After five years of independence, a frontal war started between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Officially, Ethiopia and Eritrea are at war again. Chester Crocker argues that the parties involved in the conflict should not be seen as representing all of Ethiopia

against all of Eritrea. Notwithstanding their shared ethnicity, Tigrayans and Eritreans are at odds. Remarkably, well-known Eritreans and Tigrayans share this opinion. The former member of the Politburo of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, Ghebru Assrat, is adamant that the Eritreans are targeting only Tigray and not the whole of Ethiopia. Alemseged Tesfai, an Eritrean, also argues that the war is the result of Tigrayan ambition to occupy all or parts of Eritrea (Tsfai, 2023). Because of their divergent goals and interests, the war is essentially between the Tigrayans, who rule Ethiopia, and the rulers of Eritrea. It would be easy to classify Eritrea's and Tigray's leader's disagreement as intra-ethnic conflict given Patrick Gilkes's claim that they come from the same Tigrayan ethnic group (Leenco, 2003: 369-88).

Nevertheless, the war ended with the intervention of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Security Council. With the agreement signed on December 12, 2000, the Algiers Agreement sought an end to the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000). This agreement emphasizes the end of hostilities, the creation of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to draw the border, and the plans to repatriate displaced people, among the main points. Tensions persisted because of difficulties putting the agreement into practice, especially Ethiopia's concerns about the EEBC's choice regarding the town of Badme. Finally, with the diplomatic efforts of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia was able to accept the EEBC's decision in 2018 formally. This was a significant step toward normalizing relations and establishing enduring peace. The Algiers Agreement made clear how difficult it is to settle border disputes and how crucial persistent diplomatic efforts are to the agreement's effective execution (Leenco, 2003: 382).

Eritrea has faced several challenges and conflicts since its independence, such as a border war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000, a second border war with Djibouti in 2008, political and economic isolation from its neighbors and the world, a human rights crisis, and a refugee exodus, and a lack of democracy and development. It is nicknamed East African North Korea due to the authoritarian regime and the ultimate suppression that the government is subject to the citizens. It has never known any development within 30 years of independence.

In conclusion, the author gives a comprehensive overview of the Horn of Africa, focusing on ancient history, colonization, and decolonization. The region is

characterized by different ethnic groups, languages, and religions, with Islam serving as a unifying element. For example, the ancient nomadic way of life, epitomized by the Reer Guura, played an essential role in the historical dynamics of the Horn of Africa.

The narrative looks at the impact of colonization and examines the influence of the Ottoman Empire and later Italy's conquest of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Italian-Ethiopian War of 1896 and subsequent events underscore the complex geopolitical history of the region. Djibouti's experience under French colonialism is also described in detail, tracing the country's development from a strategic port to an independent state in 1977.

Eritrea, once part of Italian East Africa, has had a turbulent history, with periods of Italian colonization, UN-supervised autonomy, annexation by Ethiopia and finally gaining independence in 1993. The author concluded with the challenges Eritrea faced after independence, including conflicts with Ethiopia and Djibouti, political isolation, human rights problems, and economic stagnation. The narrative paints a nuanced picture of the history of the Horn of Africa, revealing the complexity of cultural diversity, geopolitical struggles, and the ongoing impact of historical events on today's socio-political landscape.

Understanding the historical background described in the preceding chapter is essential as we go to the chapter on Peace and Security Challenges in Eastern Africa. The complex interweaving of colonial legacies, ethnic diversity, and geopolitical factors has dramatically shaped the region's current situation. We will now explore the modern peace and security issues that Eastern Africa faces, looking at the elements that make it challenging to keep things stable in this historically significant but unstable region. The next chapter will discuss the many aspects of peace and security concerns in Horn Africa, ranging from border disputes and regional wars to internal struggles and global implications.

### 3. PEACE AND SECURITY CHALLENGE FACTORS

In this chapter, we will discuss the complex interaction of historical narratives, regional dynamics, and present realities as we explore the diverse panorama of Peace and Security Challenges Factors in the Horn of Africa. This chapter digs into many variables that contribute to the region's issues, unraveling the complicated web that impacts peace and security in the Horn of Africa. We continue on an investigation of the fundamental variables driving the contemporary landscape of peace and security in this historically rich and vibrant area of the continent, from border disputes to internal conflicts, global consequences, and the struggle for stability.

We have seen in the previous chapter that there were border issues between Eritrea-Djibouti and between Eritrea-Ethiopia. There is also a border issue between Ethiopia-Somalia and Ethiopia-Kenya. This might be so complicated at first look, but we shall talk about how all these countries have border issues against each other and determine how this border issue is a key factor of peace and security challenges in the Horn of Africa.

#### 3.1 Ethiopian and the Somali Border War (1964-1978)

The Ogaden War, often known as the Ethiopian Somali War (*Somali: Dagaalkii Xoraynta Soomaali Galbeed, Amharic: የኢትዮጵያ ሰማሊያ ጦርነት*), was a military war involving Ethiopia and Somalia starting from July 1977 to March 1978 over the Ethiopian district of Ogaden (The Ogaden War, 2023). From the Somalian side, this war is nicknamed the West Somali Liberation War, but from the Ethiopian side, this war is seen as a protection of their land. Above all, the Ogaden region is situated within southeastern Ethiopia and derives its name from the Ogadeeni, a prominent Somali clan. While Somalis lay claim to the region, it was ceded to Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II in 1897 by the British following his military conquest in 1887 (Mason, 2008). Subsequently, the region was incorporated into Italian

Somaliland in 1936, only to be restored to Ethiopia by the British in 1948, despite the objections of some of its inhabitants, greatly distressing Somali nationalists.

In 1992, Ethiopia acknowledged the Ogaden as one of nine ethnic regions given regional autonomy, allowing for its own local government (Britannica, Ogaden, 2023). Subsequently, the Ogaden has been represented by various groups, such as the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) and the Somali People's Democratic Party, with notable involvement from the Ethiopian government.



**Figure 3. 1 Bhaso, Ndzendze, (August 30, 2022) Remembering the Ogaden War 45 Years Later: 4½ Lessons Towards a Peaceful Future, (Durban, South Africa. ACCORD**

Research: Department 2021), p.3.

This is a map of Ethiopia and Somalia; the yellow part of this map describes the territory of Ogadenia, which is the largest border shared between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This describes the border issue when two Somali States live close to each other or as neighbors, but one is governed by a leader different from their ethnicity and religion. Only this border issue can be seen as an ethnic problem, and at the same time, a national problem.

There are only two factors that led to a border war:

- The first factor dates back to 1944, when the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement was signed. The conditions of this agreement-maintained Ethiopia's position as a sovereign state, but the Ogaden area and the border territories with the French Coast of the Somalis (called the "preserved Areas" or Haud), the Djibouti and Addis Ababa railroad, and the Haud would all be temporarily under British rule. The British also acquired control over currency and imports and exports (Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, 2023). The reserved area's headquarters was in Dire Dawa but was moved to Jigjiga (the capital city of the Ogadenian region) after the agreement. Several official reports from the Ethiopian government indicate that the behavior of British officials was notably disorderly from the outset. In February 1942, it was reported that British officer Colonel Feasy forcibly lowered the Ethiopian flag amid strong opposition. Additionally, during a visit to Jigjiga in 1942, the Major Governor of Berbara declared to the Somali people that Jigjiga was no longer under Ethiopian jurisdiction, which clearly violated the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942. Higher authorities in Addis expressed considerable apprehension at the officer's actions, which infringed on Ethiopia's sovereignty and hindered the smooth running of civil administrations (Eshete, 1991: 11-12).

British authorities, while meddling in Ethiopian governmental matters, exerted a significant influence on the socio-political environment, especially in Jigjiga and the surrounding regions. With dominance over much of the Ogaden area, the British administration began considering the establishment of a unified Somali entity, although a comprehensive plan was lacking. The ethnic animosity between the Amhara and the Somali intensified, fueled by an anti-Amhara sentiment that had already surfaced during the Italian rule. This sentiment became more pronounced under British governance, fostering conflict and laying the foundation for enduring ethnic divisions in the area (Eshete T, 1991: 12).

- The second factor that led to an immediate border war was the foreign policy of Siad Baree, who was the president of Somalia, and whose mother was Ogadenian. He was a nationalist president and semi-dictator who wanted to unify all the Somali-speaking territories into one federal state. Some people

describe him as a hero, while others see him as a dictator. He was a general who came to power by a military coup in 1969 (Britannica, 2024, May 1). Siad Barre's dream was to create a greater unified Somalia. He promoted the idea of a Greater Somalia (*Soomaaliweyn*), which encompasses the regions in the Horn of Africa where ethnic Somalis reside and have historically been the predominant population. This includes Somalia, Djibouti, the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and Kenya's former Northeastern Province areas, where Somalis are the majority of the population to varying extents. In July 1977, the Ogaden War erupted when Barre's government sought to integrate the Somali-inhabited territories of the region into a Greater Somalia, starting with the Ogaden (Gebru, 2000: 366).

The Somali national army, under Barre's leadership, invaded Ethiopia, which was then under the communist rule of the Soviet-backed Derg (Wikimedia, 2024). Initially successful, they captured most of the Ogaden territory. The invasion came to an abrupt halt when the Soviet Union shifted its support to Ethiopia, prompting nearly the entire communist world to ally against Somalia. The Soviets ceased their previous aid to Barre's regime and escalated the provision of aid, weapons, and training to the Ethiopian government. Additionally, they deployed approximately 15,000 Cuban troops to bolster the Ethiopian regime (Bhaso, 2022).

In September 1977, the Somalian army occupied the entire Ogadenian region. Through the efforts of the Somalian army, Siad Barre managed to achieve the unification of the Somali people's territory. Nevertheless, Siad Barre continued his invasion of the neighboring region of Dire Dawa, where the Ethiopian army was ready to defend their territory. At this time, the table of the war turned the opposite; the Soviet Union was helping the Somalian army in the conquest of the territory of Somalia, but after seeing the unstop invasion toward the capital of Ethiopia, the Soviet Union this time gave all their help to Ethiopia including arms, tanks and deployed Cuban military forces in the war to align with Ethiopia.

The outcome of the Ethiopian-Somali War was significantly influenced by external interventions, particularly from the Soviet Union and Cuba, during the final two months of the conflict. While leadership incompetence on the Somali side played a role in their failure, the decisive factors were the overwhelming numerical superiority and technological advantage of 18,000 Cubans and about 1,500 Soviet

military personnel (Papp, 1979: 110). This assistance proved crucial in the Somali defeat and expulsion. Despite the pivotal role played by Cuban-Soviet intervention, the Ethiopians, through resolute efforts and determination, ultimately checked the Somali advance and fought them to a deadlock for six grueling months. By independently stabilizing the front, the Ethiopians turned the situation in their favor. Ultimately, in 1978, Somali forces were expelled from the Ogaden region. Subsequently, in April 1978, the Italians indicated the desire to mediate between the sides, and they were made aware of Ethiopia's conditions in unambiguous terms: that Somalia openly and ultimately leave its policy of expansion against Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Somalia will formally affirm its acceptance of all UN and OAU values, resolutions, and decisions. That Somalia sincerely pledges that it would observe international agreements as well as the rules of nonuse of force in interstate relations; and that Somalia engages itself to compensate Ethiopia promptly and effectively for the war losses incurred (Yihun, 2014: 677-691).

The conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, initially localized in a remote area of Africa, escalated into the most significant conflict on the continent, drawing direct involvement from the USSR during the Cold War period. The Soviet intervention came as a shock to Somalia, a former ally. It raised concerns among Western allies in the region due to the speed and extent of the USSR's armament of Ethiopia, which was unexpected (Papp, 1979: 110). This war had far-reaching consequences for both Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia's military triumph restored national pride, bolstered the army's reputation, and prevented potential disintegration. However, it also solidified authoritarian military governance, particularly under the leadership of Mengistu. Additionally, the success in the Ogaden region emboldened Ethiopian leaders to seek a similar victory in the north, triggering a civil war and eventual fragmentation of the country.

On the Somali side, the loss in the Ogaden led to significant repercussions. It undermined the authority in Mogadishu and hastened the disintegration and downfall of the Somali nation. Widespread disillusionment and dissatisfaction following the defeat resulted in a failed coup, followed by executions and defections (Yihun, 2014: 677-691). The regime encountered challenges from a fractured opposition, which gained momentum by the close of 1990. In January 1991, President Barre fled

Mogadishu, precipitating the government and civil administration's disintegration. Signifying the collapse of the Somali state.

Therefore, even today, some people from Somalia still hope to look after the Greater Somalia and that one day Somalia will unify (Tahlil, 2022). Truthfully, we cannot see a Greater Somalia because the political issue of the Federal State of Somalia is unstable and will never be stable in the coming years. We will see this in detail in the chapter on Case Studies.

After what we have seen in the previous part, the border issue effect can be described as a foreign intervention (with the British occupation of Ogadenia) or the effect of British imperialism in the region. It created a separation of the Somali nation, which resulted in a war.

One may ask why all this foreign intervention in the Horn of Africa happened. Because of the opening of the Suez Canal, the region appeared to be more strategic, geographically, and geopolitically. At the same time, each Western power has aimed to be closer to the Red Sea by establishing embassies and military bases in the Horn of Africa. It shaped in two ways the economy and the policy of the region.

### **3.2 The Horn Africa's Policy**

Fifty years ago, scholars were discussing in the New States (the Third World) whether there would be parties, parliaments, and free elections and whether they were to be democratic, liberal, or socialist. A great deal turned on whether these institutions (Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary) were viable in the Third World and what adjustments in them might prove necessary to make them so. However, today, nothing in those writings seems more realistic (Jackson, 1984:422).

In the Horn of Africa, the general politics are marked by the totalitarian regimes in Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. When we look at the history of these countries, Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 by war. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was the only party fighting against the occupation of Ethiopia. After their independence, the leader of ELF, Isaias Afewerki automatically became the president and shaped the ELF into the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) (Ogbazghi, 2011).

In 1952, Eritrea was a state of the Ethiopian Federation. The Eritrean Liberation Movement started in 1958, and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) took over in 1961. When Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie destroyed Eritrea's autonomous status and annexed it as a province in 1962, the ELF expanded in membership (Arnold, 2023). The ELF waged a deliberate campaign of guerrilla warfare against the Ethiopian government in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it had no time to fulfill its potential before the first Ethiopian offensive came in 1967 (Markakis, 1988: 58). In 1970, an ELF section split to create the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. The EPLF seized control of much of Eritrea's countryside and established functioning governments in the regions it ruled.

As Soviet support for Ethiopia's socialist government decreased in the late 1980s, the EPLF allied with guerrilla groups in Tigray province and other parts of Ethiopia, and when these groups overthrew the central government and took over the Ethiopian capital in May 1991, the EPLF established a separate provisional government for Eritrea. Following the staging of a United Nations-supervised referendum on independence in April 1993, the EPLF proclaimed Eritrea the following month. As part of its metamorphosis into Eritrea's leading political party, the EPLF renamed itself the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in February 1994 (Britannica, March 20, 2023). Indeed, after all this warfare, Eritrea got its sovereign state with Isaias Afewerki as its leader and president.

### **3.2.1 The people's front of democracy and justice political path**

A report from the National Library of Australia proves that Isaias Afewerki lays between the world's 20 living dictators (Wallechinsky, 2006). This is true because Isaias put Eritrea among the world's ten poorest countries, with a 700-dollar GDP per Capita (Rao, 2023). Eritrea was and remains a dictatorship state that emerged from a thirty-year liberation struggle and built itself on a personality cult centered on the liberation movement's leader, Isaias Afewerki, who led the country for 30 years. This state is built on a military-political alliance known as the Peoples' Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), which is nowadays labeled as Please Forget Democracy and Justice by the Eritrean diasporas (Bernal, 2013). The PFDJ, which has a tight inner circle, legitimizes the president by laying out and implementing his social mobilization objectives. It has four departments: political, organizational, economic, and cultural affairs. These departments are ultimately accountable for

political and cultural indoctrination via the use of patriotic pride and symbols of national unity (Ogbazghi, 2011). PFDJ officials control all government organizations.

Moreover, civil society does not exist in Eritrea. It can be defined as a civil society waiting for the government's order. No one can engage in any policy, social, or cultural activity without the order of the PFDJ authorities.

The organizational affairs department's responsibilities include international intelligence, finance raising, and oversight of Eritrean diaspora communities. It deploys Eritrean embassies and consulates abroad for this purpose, which are constantly monitored by the party (Ogbazghi, 2011). Because, after all these restrictions and suppression of the people, a massive wave of immigration started. Millions of people fled from their countries to their neighbors like South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and several European countries. The worst immigrants reside in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and South Sudan.

The GCC country's government forces migrant workers to rely on their consular or embassy for the renewal of passports otherwise they will be deported to Eritrea where they will have to face a prison sentence. The PFDJ has devised ingenious strategies to utilize the old diaspora (refugees from the last independence struggle) and new refugees who fled from national service. Both parties are obliged to pay a 2% diaspora tax as well as supplementary payments (Hirt, 2015: 115-132). 1991 (the year of de facto independence), Eritrean embassies across the globe have kept a record of the precise quantities paid by each Eritrean. Those who pay the tax are granted clearance, which allows them to access government services like getting birth and marriage certificates, purchasing land in Eritrea, operating a company, and obtaining departure permits for elderly relatives. However, the most significant service for many diaspora Eritreans is passport extension, which primarily impacts over 100,000 Eritreans who work in Middle Eastern nations and require legitimate documents to get work permits there, forcing them to pay (Hirt, 2015: 115-132).

Furthermore, the GCC governments forbid any political organization among expatriate communities and restrict the ability of any political or civic opposition groups to organize within their oppressive borders. It also does not accept any political asylum. This pressure favors the necessity of the Eritrean migrants to go

under their embassy, which forces them to pay taxes and participate in seminars and celebrations.

Therefore, the PFDJ regime's connection with its diasporic groups is founded at the *mahbere-koms*, which is a place located in every city outside Eritrea populated by Eritrean migrants like Jeddah and Riyadh (Hirt and Mohammad, 2022: 84). This place serves as a meeting point between the PDFJ and the Eritrean migrants. For example: “Authorities get suspicious of Eritreans who do not routinely attend their local mahbere-kom. Local community leaders warned to a Jeddah-based informant visiting his wife and children in Asmara. The informant was staying around his family, and they learned that he hadn't been to the mahbere-kom in Jeddah regularly, and they suggested that he go more often to prevent any consequences for his Asmara-based family (Hirt and Mohammad, 2018).

Finally, the economic affairs section is the party's financial arm. It manages all state-owned firms and is involved in various economic activities, like service, agriculture, and manufacturing. While commerce, foreign currency, finance, communications, transport, and shipping are key state-controlled service industries, the industrial sector is dominated by metalworking, vehicle repair, road surfacing, well drilling, and mining. Initially, most of these businesses were privately owned until the government forced them to enter joint ventures with the party in which the latter holds majority stakes, profits, and other mandatory payments in exchange for the government-supplied free national service labor force (Ogbazghi, 2011). According to specific sources, including counterterrorism specialists, Eritrea provides Al Shabab with armaments (Masters, 2014). This is so dangerous because it alerts the security of the region.

In sum, as we can see the political path of this country seems so challenging to achieve peace, democracy, and stability. Therefore, this political view is one of the most challenging factors in peace and security. As a result, we have determined that border disputes and the political path of Eritrea have a significant impact on the peace and security in the region. In the following part, we will elaborate on other challenging peace and security factors which are piracy, and weapon dealing.

### **3.3 A Failed State in the Horn of Africa**

In the Horn of Africa, a state's failure facilitates all kinds of insecurity factors inside and outside its border. The Somali state was in failure for nearly 16 years, and this facilitated the emergence of Al Shabab and piracy. According to Philip Goose piracy is defined as the act of robbing the ships in the sea. "piracy, like murder, is one of the earliest recorded human activities. The reference to it coincides with the earliest references to travel and trade, it is likely that very soon after Humankind started moving commodities from one place to another, several ambitious people emerged who realized they could make money by intercepting these items while they were being transported" (Gosse, 1932:1). Piracy has gone through well-defined cycles in all the world's waters and all eras. Initially, a few individuals from the poorest coastal districts would join discrete groups, each owning one or few vessels, and attack only the merchantmen's ship. The piracy in Somalia resulted from impoverished conditions, massive unemployment, and lack of local opportunities for education or any other path to better living standards (Ingiriis, 2013:240). The timing of the piracy emergence was good because it started as soon as the state came out of the Ogadenian war against Ethiopia and the overthrowing of Siad Barre from the leadership. These causes put the country in chaos, and people were fighting against each other.

The 19th century was the most challenging decade for Somalia, on one hand, there was Al Shabab, which wanted to control the country, On the other hand, there was the civil war between Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, in addition to this the pirates made their appearance. Therefore, according to the International Chamber of Commerce's Piracy Reporting Center (ICC-PRC) figures, between 2005 and 2008, Somali pirates hijacked at least 230 ships and 537 crew were taken hostage (Møller, 2009).

In 2008, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released a report stating that there had been a doubling of piracy off the coast of Somalia, with over 60 ships being attacked. Pirates have become more assertive, brash, demanding, and accustomed to receiving payments of millions of dollars in ransom (Chatham House, 2008). Indeed, the international community became aware that the Somali pirates become an international terrorist network. Furthermore, armed groups are now assaulting foreign vessels not only in the

territorial sea but even farther out than 200 nautical miles from shore as a result of the conflict in Somalia spreading farther and wider into the waters off its borders. Concerns raised by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) have now led to two legal instruments that may contribute significantly to the local counterpiracy effort. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1473 uses Chapter VII powers to approve the deployment of foreign armed forces and law enforcement for a six-month period in the Somali territorial waters to combat piracy and armed robbery (Guilfoyle, 2008: 691).

The Red Sea being a strategic point for the world's economy, cargo, and shipment transport, Somalian pirates turned into a threat to international peace and security. Because of this Djibouti, the neighbor of Somalia welcomed four foreign military bases France, USA, Japan, Italy, and recently China. Each of them aimed to secure their shipments against the pirates and to closely suppress the pirates in the region (Ezeh, and Ezirim, 2023:10-26). In Djibouti, America's military Camp Lemonnier is assumed to be the hub and medium for the US to expand and extend its Global War on Terrorism campaign, especially in the Horn of Africa region. Some studies have revealed that such campaigns as counterterrorism missions in Somalia, Yemen, and other troubled neighboring countries have been confirmed to be launched from Djibouti including American drone strikes against militants in Yemen (Ezeh, and Ezirim, 2023:10-26).

After the Security Council's call for the counter-piracy in late 2008, several forces deployed in the Red Sea, such as the US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which is headquartered in Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and associated with Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), which is mainly tasked with counter-terrorist operations (Møller, 2009).

- Then, in October 2008, NATO sent the Standing NATO Maritime Group-2 (SNMG2) for Operation "Allied Provider," tasked with providing protection for commerce boats as well as a ship hired by humanitarian organizations such as the World Food Program (WFP) (Bernal, 2024).

- Finally, the European Union deployed Operation Atalanta in December 2008, primarily to provide protective armed units onboard WFP vessels delivering food to the Somali population, as well as general protection against and the

deterrence of pirates in the form of naval escorts for civilian ship convoys (House of Lords, 2012).

Generally, the federal government of Somalia is still seen as a failed state because the power-sharing between the states is unbalanced. There are already two Somali states in the Horn of Africa, the federal Somali and Somaliland.

### **3.3.1 The separation of the Somali Federal State (1991)**

Having two Somali states: one federal and the other a republic (Republic of Somaliland) defines the failure of the Federal state of Somalia and still causes a threat to the peace and security of the Horn of Africa. “In order to supply food and water across the Red Sea to their colony of Aden, the British established the Somaliland Protectorate in the 1880s. On the vital route connecting England with the jewel colony of India, Aden served as a significant port and harbor for the British fleet and commercial ships. Meanwhile, the federal Somali state was under Italian colonialism (Adam, 1994:22). As soon as they gained independence, they joined Somalia, which took independence from Italy, together to form the greater Somalian state, which put them into the border war between Ethiopia and Somalia.

Nonetheless, the civil war in Somalia began with the overthrow of Siad Barre's authoritarian rule, and immediately clans arose. Despite having diverse clans and tribes, the Somaliland people stepped away from the civil war and vowed to create their republic and never join the Federal Somali state. Therefore, the Republic of Somaliland has stayed in prosperous peace since that time. However, the Federal state of Somalia has decayed formation, and still today, the government system is unbalanced, and the Republic of Somaliland is still searching for recognition around the world. Although it does not seem that they will get recognition around the world. Indeed, after eight times of conversations between the two presidents of the states, on December 27<sup>th</sup> started a new conversation in Djibouti with the mediation of the president of Djibouti, Ismael Omar Guelleh (Djib-live,2023). The deal signed on that date followed two days of talks mediated by Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh, the first of their kind since 2020 when similar negotiations stalled. After lengthy discussions, the two sides have agreed to resume the process of talks. With the focus on issues of national interest to reach a sustainable solution, said a joint statement published by the Somali presidency (The East African News, 2023). Even so, the

Somaliland people especially the Issac tribe which holds the power of the capital (Hargeisa) don't seem to appreciate the dialogue between the two states. Thus, this issue remains a crucial political and economic problem in the Horn of Africa.

Another issue appeared while the world hoped to see a successive dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland. On 2 January 2024, in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, Somaliland's President Muse Bihi Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a memorandum of understanding. This memorandum of understanding says that Ethiopia will officially recognize the republic of Somaliland while Somaliland will grant naval and commercial sea access on lease to Ethiopia for 50 years (Abdi, 2024).

This memorandum of understanding shocked the Federal Somali parliament, and on Saturday, January 6, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a law nullifying the memorandum of understanding signed between the Government of Ethiopia and Somaliland. Mohamud said on his Twitter account that "the law's signing illustrated Somalia's commitment to safeguard our unity, sovereignty & territorial integrity as per international law" (Matthews, 2024). The memorandum agreement says that it will allow landlocked Ethiopia to lease 20 km (12 miles) surrounding the port of Berbara, on the Gulf of Aden, with access to the Red Sea, for 50 years for Ethiopia's navy and economic interests (Sheikh, 2024).

Therefore, this agreement boosted the manifestation of hatred around Berbara. There are still feelings of the Ogadenian war in the blood of the two countries' citizens so that no one can support the others. Due to the current Ethiopian possession of the Ogadenian region, which is recognized as a Somali state, the Somalian people argue that it is inconceivable for them to make any deal with the Ethiopians. This agreement could open a new disagreement and create a border war in the region if Ethiopia does not respect the statement of the Federal Somali state.

Indeed, the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland turned the dialogue between the Federal Somali state and Somaliland into a nonsense dialogue; on one hand, there was an ongoing dialogue in Djibouti between the two Somali states, and on the other hand, Somaliland is still acting anonymously, and behind the curtain with Ethiopia.

In sum, the dialogue between the Federal Somali and Somaliland had never been successful and nobody expects it to be successful, because of the current situation and because of the civil war, which caused a lot of humanitarian and material loss between Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

### **3.4 The Cause and Threat of Terrorism**

Politicians and the public have attempted to highlight the elements that encourage Terrorism ever since the September 11, 2001, assaults on the United States. “Former US President George W. Bush (2002) contended that there is a vicious cycle between terror, state collapse, and disenfranchisement. He said that since tyranny and poverty continue and can breed pessimism and despair, failing nations might end up serving as safe havens for terrorists” (Krieger, and Meierrieks, 2011:3-27). Terrorism may have minor direct costs, but it may also have significant indirect political and financial implications. For example, terrorism might weaken the stability of the administration. In addition to having a detrimental effect on capital and trade flows, terrorism can also lead to a decline in both individual and societal life satisfaction and economic progress (Krieger, and Meierrieks, 2011:3-27).

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. However, it is generally defined as the deliberate use of violence and intimidation directed at a large audience to coerce a community or government (especially foreign governments) into conceding politically and ideologically motivated demands (Krieger, and Meierrieks 2011:3-27). Unfortunately, this definition is inaccurate due to the absence of significant empirical studies of relevant cross-national factors. Several quantitative analyses of collective violence, assassination, civil strife, and crimes are not yet defined as a deliberate use of violence and intimidation.

As Krieger and Daniel discussed in their article on what Causes Terrorism; Terrorism has different perspectives between the continents. Some continents like Africa and the Middle East define terrorism as the result of a foreign intervention military on their border, so terrorism is like a war between two countries, while the American or Western perspective has two approaches:

- The first is a perception of terrorism as low-intensity warfare carried out by extreme anti-Western organizations on behalf of or in collaboration with the

Soviet Union. The battle between the two superpowers appears to trump and includes all other disputes. As a result, the goal of terrorist attacks involving US persons and interests is seen to be the weakening of US defenses in its struggle with the Soviet Union. This idea echoes the Cold War era's doctrines and worldview, according to which governments and political parties that are not associated with the United States are regarded to be against it, and their causes and claims are deemed hostile to those of the United States. The highly rigid vision of the world that the advocates of this notion have adopted leads them to explain terrorist incidents in terms of an international terrorist network and to downplay or completely ignore the role of local conditions in inciting violence. Their forced interpretation of events is evidenced in their claim that Iran, Lebanese Shiites, Libya, Al Shabab, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) serve Soviet interests (Faris, 1987: 149-154).

- The second dominant American mental construct equates terrorism with a perceived penchant for violence among particular groups, such as Palestinians, Lebanese, Libyans, Taliban, Arabs, and Muslims, and attributes this aggression to their culture. As a result, a terrorist act is characterized as Palestinian terrorism, Arab terrorism, or Islamic terrorism rather than an act of desperation by a Palestinian, Arab, or Muslim individual or organization. Whereas the first construct is based on the 1950s and 1960s mentalities, the second is based on nineteenth-century European preconceptions about Middle Eastern society (Faris, 1987: 149-154).

Admittedly, the Taliban, PLO, Libyans, or most of these organizations were fighting the US army because of the intervention of the US army or the Western coalition army in their territory. With time, some of these organizations, like Daish, and Al Shabab become intercontinental, affecting West Asia, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the West of Africa. Their belief is based on creating an Islamic state governed by Sharia, but because of their act, which does not have anything to do with Islamic Sharia or behaviour. They could not succeed in establishing.

Indeed, in Yamamoto's book entitled *The Cause and Threat of Terrorism*, "terrorism is caused by the choice to employ terrorism as a means of achieving a goal. Many causes of terrorism have been proposed, but the primary reason is the

choice to employ terrorism. As a result, to identify any reason or causes of terrorism, the decision process that leads to the selection of terrorism must be examined. Because terrorism is a purposeful choice as a technique of conflict, a terrorist attack is always preceded by a decision to utilize it. The first choice to utilize terrorism is frequently made by group decision-makers, and the final decision is made at the scene of the attack. Even when terrorism is a habitual activity, the decision to utilize the tool remains. The decision to use terrorism can be described in this way: a group or individual desires some political goal. This goal may be very small, such as trying to prevent the development of a piece of land, or very large, such as trying to replace governments”. (Yamamoto, 2015).

Organizations opt to utilize terrorism primarily for two reasons. First, they do not believe that they can achieve their goals through other means, they do not believe they are making enough progress toward their goal through other methods and are unwilling to keep trying and believe that terrorism will provide them with additional tools to pursue their goal. Secondly, group members may not believe they have the political or military might to achieve their aims in nonviolent ways, such as mass rallies or voting, or through violent ones, such as revolution or guerrilla warfare (Yamamoto, 2015: 56-70).

Terrorism requires the idea that the aims being sought are more important than the rights of people who will be affected by the attacks (or that the victims have no rights). Terrorism requires the idea that the aims being sought are more important than the rights of people who will be affected by the attacks (or that the victims have no rights). Al Qaeda militants felt that their objectives outweighed the rights of the thousands of individuals they killed and wounded during the 9/11 attacks (Yamamoto, 2015:56-70).

Al Shabab leader Mahad Karatay was asked in an interview with Jamal, a journalist at Chanel 4: “The poor lady selling tea outside, the one cleaning the street, the street passers who have nothing to do with politics, why are they being killed?” Mahad Karatay responded that those people have not been killed intentionally, but it is a conflict zone, and it is difficult to say that these people can be spared because of the tools that have been used. He was also asked why he is against democracy. He answered that “democracy is a religion for non-Muslims. It is against our beliefs and identity. We are Muslims, and democracy cannot be compatible. Democracy is about

the people's choice, and we believe that the legislation is for only Allah". "Finally, he says we aim to take over Somalia because we see that the leaders are not legitimate" (Karate, 2022).

Despite these views of terrorism, some other views, like the situation in Palestine, differ totally from those of Al Shabab. Al Hamas is fighting to get back control of their sovereignty but still, the West sees it as a terrorist organization. Today, while freedom fighters and terrorists can be differentiated easily, the West struggles to separate freedom fighters and terrorists, and the Western media develops that a terrorist act is only when a Muslim person kills another religious or ethnic individual from another country. Nevertheless, not when a Muslim person is killed deliberately by another person from another country or another religion. Many attempts have been made to explain the acceptance of terrorism in terms of conditions, which are frequently referred to as "root causes". The following have all been suggested as contributing factors to terrorism: historical traditions, ideologies that support violence, religious divisions, ideological differences, exploitation, oppression, poverty, inequality, discrimination, globalization, modernization, and the absence of democratic institutions to address grievances.

Consequently, we conclude that only resolving the reasons listed above will put a stop to international terrorism. These reasons are capitalism, neocolonialism, racism, the policy of aggression, foreign occupation, and their effects, similar to how Israel occupies Palestine. However, the activities of some organizations like Al Shabab should be seen as real terrorism and international peace threats. We will elaborate in detail in the following parts on the problems and the consequences of Al Shabab in the Horn of Africa.

### **3.5 Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Somalia**

Almost all African states have withstood terrorism in one way or another. Some countries have eradicated terrorist groups in their countries, while others still survive with the terrorist groups. Therefore, this led Somalia to become a country that is described as a fragile state, and which had the most dangerous terror group called Al Shabab. Al Shabab (Harakat Al Shabab Al Mujahidin, Mujahidin Youth Movement) is a Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist group that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2022 labeled "the most extensive, wealthiest, and most

lethal Al Qaeda affiliate in the world today” (Blanchard, 2020:1). AFRICOM reports that the group poses the greatest danger to U.S. citizens and interests in East Africa and is a threat to the United States.

Furthermore, from 1969 to 1991, Mohamed Siad Barre a military, and head of state, presided over the Somali Democratic Republic as its third governor. He, by himself, came to power by a military coup. Thus, he was a supreme dictator, leading the country himself (Ingiriis, (2016:69). He started to bring his family closer to the ultimate power, like appointing people from his family or his clan to some main position even if they were not educated. In addition, for the first time in Somalian history, the cult of personality around the president was cultivated (Ingiriis, 2016:69). In brief, this changed the country into a tribal war, where everybody wanted to defend his tribe. Indeed, clan discrimination and tribalism started in the Somalian community. Finally, the terrorist group found a way to act freely when the state started to collapse.

Al Shabab appeared in 2000 in Somalia. This terrorist group roots its origins in a man called Abdallah Yusuf Mostafa Azzam who was a global jihadist philosopher. He was encouraging people to Jihad against Israel. Palestinians called him the Imam of Jihad, which, means leader of the Jihad, because of the vital role he plays in the global jihad movement. He is also described as the contact point between the Mujaheddin and the Near-East Islamic movement (Riedel, 2012:28). This man's speech caught the attention of two Somalian adults, Ahmed Jihad, and Ibrahim Afghan. They were even members of the Mujaheddin of Afghanistan which were fighting against the USSR. The policies of Abdallah Yusuf Mostafa Azzam were carried out in Afghanistan and went to Somalia. Therefore, in Somalia, this young jihadist came to the country at a time when the government was destroyed, and the clans were so divided that they could not come together and rebuild a government. There is this issue of clans in Somalia in which clans discriminate against each other, saying that my stature surpasses yours, or you constitute a smaller portion of the populace in the capital city, or you belong to a smaller demographic group in the capital city. It is important to note that from then till now, every clan in Somalia has had its army equipped with guns and tanks even though they are a member of the federal army.

In 1990, Ibrahim Afghan and Ahmed Jihad opened a school that later changed into a military base called Al Ittihad Al Islami in the country's southeastern part. They started breaching the lower classes to do Jihad against the leader of the country and to rule the country under Islamic law known as Chariya. They shared Abdallah Azzam's view of Jihad and said that Sharia could bring justice and a better life than the current Westernized government system.

Al Ittihad Al Islami continued to open other military bases when the government was about to collapse. They declared that they needed an army to protect their family against the clan wars, so they got support from Al-Qaeda. In addition to that, they brought weapons illegally into the country. They recruited adults into their army.

Indeed, Al Ittihad occupied a State called Geddo, located in the southwest of Somalia in 1991-1996 after they were defeated in a war in which they wanted to occupy other states in Somalia (Battle of Gedo, 2023). They applied Sharia, which was the only part of Somalia that was in peace in the 1990s. However, the people disagreed with being ruled by Sharia. The World Aid companies wanted to work with this newborn organization, and the group let the aid companies come into their lands and work with it. The objective of this organization was to make Somalia an Islamic country ruled by Chariya. After two years in which Al Itihad Al Islami tried to open other military camps in other cities occupied by clan groups, Al Itihad was defeated, and they started to run away from their camps. Sincerely, in 1992, clans like SSDF were more powerful strategically and politically than Al Itihad Al Islami. In short, this resulted in the withdrawal of some important places where the terrorists had been controlling.

In September 1997, the young leaders of Al Itihad came together in the capital city to meet and discuss what to do and the organization's future. The agenda of this meeting was whether to stay on the armed Jihadism or to breach the religion as Jihadism without armies. Nevertheless, the members of the group were divided between these two agendas. Some of them, like the chairman Sheikh Mahamoud Issa and the ex-chairman of the group, were defending the idea of staying out of armed jihadism and not fighting again instead the organizations will only have to breach the Sharia rules and the Islamic governance system vocally. Whereas the other members like Ibrahim Afghan and Omar Ali known as Omar Mereeh were defending the

argument of Abdallah Yusuf Mostafa Azzam which says that while doing Jihad weapons are necessary. They wanted revenge to cover their loss in the battle against the clans. In an interview with one of the chairpersons, who was supporting the weaponized jihad said, that they were angry about their loss in the fight and that a clan destroyed their schools and training camps, so it became necessary to fight back or to continue the organization using weaponized Jihad against the clans and that one day they will pay-back the damage that they did.

After the meeting, they decided to divide Al Etihad Al Islami into two factions: Al Etisam Al Kitab Al Sunna, (in this faction there were those who wanted to breach orally the religious teachings), and the New Salafist Jihadism, (in this faction there are those who wanted to apply weaponized Jihadism). Therefore, the New Salafist Jihadism became with time, the terrorist group known as Al Shabab. Here it is, where the question about the origins of Al Shabab is answered. Some people believe that it is rooted in Al Etihad Al Islam whereas others believe that Al Shabab roots its origins in Afghanistan's view of Jihad.

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the US decided to intensify counterterrorism efforts and set up a military facility in Djibouti. Initially, this was restricted to targeted strikes, but in 2002, the US administration recognized that sustained cooperation with local governments and communities would be necessary to curb extremism. As a result, it established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa to conduct stability operations in the area. In November 2002, the CJTF-HOA staff, a Marine-based organization, arrived off the coast of Djibouti aboard USS Mount Whitney, a naval command ship. However, within one year of renewal and reinforcement, especially in 2002, Al Shabab started to attack seriously the United States of America's Nairobi Embassy and Dar al-Salam United States of America's Embassy (Venturini, 2022).

More than 200 individuals were murdered, and 4,500 more were injured in these explosions. Al-Qaeda, which sees the United States and its Western allies as "the root cause of the Middle East's problems", is responsible for both assaults in Kenya and Tanzania. Al-Qaeda's objective is to lessen the power of the West and its Western allies in the Muslim world. An international audience was drawn to the Al Shabab attack because it revealed a second Al Qaeda presence in East Africa, following a protracted and bloody battle between the African Union and the United

States of America. Al Shabab appears to be mainly concentrated in a few regions of Somalia right now, where it continues to assault certain people and target government-run buildings like schools.

Al-Shabaab's suicide bombings, the very recent was on October 29, 2022, near the Ministry of Education in the capital city Mogadishu, and left at least 121 people dead and 333 injured, according to Somalia's Ministry of Health. Most of the people injured or died were civilians. An earlier Al-Shabaab attack on Mogadishu's Hayat Hotel on August 21, 2022, killed at least 22 civilians and 30 injured (UNHR, 2022). In addition to the deliberate targeting of civilians, the latest information gathered by the United Nations Human Rights Office indicates that in recent months, Al-Shabaab has destroyed numerous wells and poisoned another in the Hiraan region, at a time when Somalis are facing extreme hardship due to drought in many parts of the country. Al-Shabaab also destroyed part of the riverbank of the Shabelle River, houses, a bridge, the disabling telecommunication antennas, and 11 schools. After all, it is almost difficult to capture all Al Shabab's leaders and members or to kill them because the Somalian government is already turned apart and does not provide maximum security to their civilians. Therefore, Al Shabab takes taxes from Somalian businessmen and some military lieutenants work with them secretly. This ends the hope of the civilians who might think about a country without a terror group. It is also crucial to note that the border control of these East African countries is not controlled efficiently; some people might enter by walking without passing through any border controls or without being checked at the border. This means that most of the borders between the countries are not mobilized by any army, just in one or two official entries.

### **3.5.1 Terrorism in Kenya**

Kenya is a country in East Africa, sharing a 680-kilometer land border with Somalia (Ominde, 2024). Despite sharing a wide border with Somalia, Kenya has slightly over two million Somalians (Lafforgue, 2024). Kenya has had an astonishing amount of terrorist activity in the last ten years, bearing much of the burden of international terrorist attacks in Africa. This wave of violence includes an incident in 1998 in which a vehicle bomb exploded in the heart of Nairobi, killing 213 people and injuring almost 4,000 people. The US embassy in Nairobi was the intended target of this attack. Another vehicle bomb targeting the US embassy in Dar es

Salaam, Tanzania, detonated at the same time, wounding 85 people (Kamau, 2006:133-41). Al Shabab admitted these attacks because, at that time, they were attacking only foreign forces like the United States of America and Israel.

Furthermore, in 2002, an Israeli-owned resort in the seaside town of Mombasa was bombed, killing 18 people. Three Israeli visitors and twelve Kenyans were murdered in an explosion after three bombers exploded their explosive-laden four-wheel-drive SUV. In a simultaneous incident, a missile was fired at an Israeli plane taking departure from Mombasa's Moi International Airport. The missiles were purportedly launched from another SUV beyond the airport perimeter fence, did not strike the aircraft, and were discovered in the countryside up to 40 kilometers distant (Kamau, 2006:133-41).

Terrorist assaults in Nairobi and Mombasa made Kenyans feel incredibly insecure. Even though the assaults were aimed at foreign interests, Kenyans faced the brunt of the damage. Domestic pressure mounted on the authorities to investigate and prosecute potential terrorists. In response to public pressure, Kenya's Minister of Home Affairs, Moody Awori, announced that “the threat of terrorism has dealt a significant blow to the Kenyan economy and must be combated by all means” (Kamau, 2006:133-41). Statements like this from top government leaders attempted to ease Kenyans' worries about repeated assaults.

In retaliation for Kenya's commitment to participate in African Union military operations in Somalia (On January 19, 2007, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union formed the African Union Mission in Somalia AMISOM) (AMISOM,2024). Kenya got in 2013, one of the most challenging attacks ever. On September 21, 2013, Al Shabab took possession of Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall. The terrorists liberated all Muslims, kidnapped the others, and they began to fire on the Christians. Al Shabab made this attack to show and to negotiate with the Kenyan leaders that they wanted an immediate departure of Kenyan troops from Somalia in return for the liberation of the mall and the kidnapped people. Al Shabab could not succeed in their operation. Therefore, on the 24th of September, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta announced that the siege of the Westgate Mall had been lifted. According to the President, five aggressors were murdered, and eleven were apprehended (Bar, 2016:147-164).

After several years of an intense fight between AMISOM and Al Shabab, AMISOM established a great victory against Al Shabab and played a crucial role in re-establish a new Federal Government in Somalia, which was able to reconstruct the federal army and advancing the fight with Al Shabab. This terror organization is one of the main insecurities in the region. Al Shabab has become an ultra-power terrorist group that can cause terror attacks anywhere in the region. Indeed, Kenya experienced this kind of terror attack from Al Shabab. Altogether, terrorism does not remain the only peace-challenging factor in the region, but tribalism or clannism also plays a crucial role in instability in some regions like Somalia. Therefore, in the coming section, we will elaborate on the effect of tribalism in Ethiopia.

### **3.6 Tribalism Issues in The Horn of Africa and its Effects: A Case Study of Ethiopia**

Ethiopia has several distinctive ethnic groups cohabiting together and sharing political space. Since the last 2007 census, the majority of Ethiopians were Oromo (34.4%), followed by Amhar (27%), Somalians (6.2%), Tigray (6.1%), Afar (1.7%) and the rest shared by other several ethnicities. Within this multiplicity of ethnicity, there have been deep grievances over how power within the country should be shared (Lowings, 2022). Therefore, why is Amharic the official language while Oromo or Somali is not?

Amharic became the language of royal correspondence during the reign of Johannes IV (1872-1889). Although the emperor himself knew Tigrinya, he felt Amharic might aid in unifying his new country. Local political elites were absorbed into the Ethiopian Empire under Menelik II (1889-1913), and Amharic became the ruler's language throughout the country's provinces. Since then, Ethiopians who wanted to advance in politics or society had to learn Amharic, the language of education, the court, and the media. Printing was established in Ethiopia under the reign of Menelik II, and Amharic became the only language in which newspapers and publications for educational and religious reasons were produced (Nouri, 2021).

Moreover, Emperor Haile Selassie, who was Amharic, declared Amharic the official language of Ethiopia in 1955 as a ploy to unify nations and nationalities under one Ethiopian identity (Kahsay, 2022). He conquered the other part of the Ethiopian territories and spread the use of the Amharic language. He was known as

Ras Tafari Makonnen. Around the world, the emperor was regarded by millions as a universal representation of African pride and sovereignty at a period when all African rulers had succumbed to European domination. As an illiterate messiah and God incarnate, as the Jamaican people believe, he became to some an imperialist and cruel ruler, to others a symbol of anti-imperialism and freedom, and to still others a haughty and self-centered king (The people profiles, 2023).

Another powerful ethnic group also came, which is the Tigray. Mengistu Haile Mariam's military takeover of the monarchy with his group of subordinate officers, known as the Derg, marked the beginning of Tigray's political emancipation. The Derg led the overthrow of the monarchy and the country's embrace of socialism, which was greatly influenced by the intellectual and student movements of the time, which supported the socialist form of government for a nation emerging from feudalism (BBC News, 2021).

While the revolution was initiated by university students, peasants, labor unions, and intellectuals, the army joined the movement because it also had administrative issues it sought to address. As a result, a mobilization committee was established and tasked with managing the negotiations with the emperor. The junior officers were from different army units throughout the nation.

Indeed, the Tigray managed to occupy all the forces of the federal country in their hands for 30 years. They dominated Ethiopia's national politics as the main party. This led to the previous Ethiopian war that started in 2020. For instance, it was a time of enormous economic growth and infrastructure development. However, some citizens accuse them of being autocratic and corrupting the government. In 2018 massive protests brought them down and swept Abi Ahmed into power. After his election, he made significant changes, like releasing politicians from prison. Abiy began dismissing officials from government jobs, thus reducing the Tigrayan minority's role in the administration. Lemma Megersa, a significant leader in 2018 political reform, sought political stability and continuity.

Nonetheless, Abiy forcibly removed TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) leaders from the central government. He also removed them from the military forces and national intelligence service, attempting to have some jailed. Furthermore, the current administration has consistently blamed the TPLF for inciting unrest without giving evidence for the claim (Jima, 2021:3). He created a new national party that

united the main ethnic political groups (Fisher, and Gebrewahd, 2019:194-206). He, initially at least, appealed to the Ethiopian people on a platform of unity, with the slogan '*medemer*' appearing to favor a united Ethiopia rather than a regionally divided one, and eventually replaced the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) coalition with a new unity political party, the Prosperity Party (Lowings, 2022). The TPLF refused to participate in that diversified national party because this centralization of politics would boost the political power to the capital city, Addis Ababa.

In contrast, the Tigray wanted to remain the hand that held all power in their territory or their district. The TPLF also believed Abiy Ahmad was consolidating his power by completely undermining their legacy. They have been controlling the country for a long time, and they put every important thing in their territory, like the Ethiopian Federal Army's arsenal. All the essential army vehicles and guns were stocked in their territory. So, they never wanted to let the new president centralize the power between the different ethnics.

In 2020, there was supposed to be a federal election in Ethiopia, but the president delayed the election by saying that 'the country is in quarantine because of the Covid-19. So, the elections will take place after the quarantine (Jima, 2021:3). The TPLF did not accept this declaration, they held their election in defiance of the federal authority. This led to a process where the federal government said that Tigray's government was not legal and constitutional. Moreover, Tigray made the same accusation against the federal government. Thus, a war started between the Tigray and the federal government soldiers.

On November 3, 2022, the TPLF forces attacked a government military base called Northern Command Headquarters in Tigray's capital city Mekelle. Then the president sent troops to stop the TPLF forces. What is known is that on November 3, 2020, the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) attacked several federal military bases of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF). Debretsion Gebremichael (Tigray Region New President) said 'This was a pre-emptive operation in response to the regrouping of federal troops on Tigray's southern border and the central government's plan to launch a military operation to arrest Tigray's leaders (Pellet, 2021:13).

In response to the attacks on the armed bases, Abiy Ahmed announced the beginning of a military operation and proclaimed a six-month rule of emergency in Tigray on November 4. The Federal Army started carrying out airstrikes on the next day.

As a surprise, the Federal troops quickly took control of the capital city of the Tigray with the help of the Eritrean soldiers who intervened in the war in favor of the Federal armies to fight against the Tigray. Several northern cities in the Tigray area claimed that during the battle, artillery was launched from Eritrea. Afterwards, Shire, Aksum, and other towns in Tigray were observed to have Eritrean soldiers. Where they played a significant role in the theft of private and state assets (Bach, 2022:243).

Nevertheless, the government thought that they won the war and that everything was under the government's control. However, by the end of June 2021, despite Eritrean involvement, the TPLF forces launched a perfect strike and took back control of their capital city, Mekelle, and they did not stop there. They rushed into the other neighboring regions of Amhara and Afar. When the TPLF took control of the war and some other territories, the government used drones against the TPLF and recaptured the extra territories that the TPLF occupied. So, the military power seems to be shifting again.

Apart from this, the war caused an enormous social fracture and displacement; the people living in the war territories fled to the country's south. Some others crossed the borders and went to Djibouti and Sudan. This caused a considerable famine and more than five hundred thousand civilians died in the war and died because of lack of water and food. Because of the war, Aid could not reach the people inside the conflict zone. The government and the TPLF are accused of restricting Aid deliveries into areas that they were controlling.

According to an International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) assessment, "the federal government is employing famine as a weapon of mass destruction and committing war crimes against humanity. Additionally, representatives of the EU and USAIDS have emphasized that the use of civilian famine as a weapon of war endangers millions of lives. In reality, the UN Security Council forbade the use of civilian starvation as a tactic and called for punishment against anyone who did so in Resolution 2417 (2018). There are indications that the Federal government and its allies are using famine as a weapon

of war in the Tigray area, according to former UN humanitarian head Mark Lowcock. Gang rape, supported by verbal and physical torture, kidnapping, and sexual enslavement on a staggering scale, has allegedly been employed by Ethiopian and Eritrean security personnel as well as regional regular and paramilitary groups” (Gebrekidan, 2022).

This happened because the Tigray wanted to control all politics and social power in their hands. It is not easy to control power when there are more than two ethnic groups in a country. Although Ethiopia is a federal country, and each region has its ethnicity and their flag. Here is a map of the ethnic territories in Ethiopia.



**Figure 3.2: Ethiopia’s Region Map with Capitals and Flags**

Source: Published on March 1, 2020, by Avrand in Wikipedia.

[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethiopian\\_Region\\_Map\\_with\\_Capitals\\_and\\_Flags.png](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethiopian_Region_Map_with_Capitals_and_Flags.png)

In summary, these issues of tribalism in East Africa, particularly Ethiopia, have had devastating, profound effects on the country. Ethiopia is multiethnic, and due to this misunderstanding, it has been a source of tension in history as power struggles have originated between the various ethnic groups that inhabit the country, as well as grievances on how political authority should be shared. Historical events, along with the leaders such as Emperor Haile Selassie, imposed Amharic as the official language, which further caused marginalization in some of the ethnic groups.

However, in the 30 years tenure and domination of Tigray in Ethiopian politics, it has created political imbalances that eventually emerged into demonstrations, later political reforms under Abiy Ahmed, and running battles together with subsequent conflicts which have proved disastrous to civilization as it

has caused death, displacement, famine, and killings among civilians. The struggle for political control and divisions on ethnic lines seeks to show the necessity for inclusive governance, and peaceful solutions for dealing with deep-rooted issues that may destabilize the region. Indeed, multi-ethnicity remains a challenging factor for peace and security, as we have seen the difficulties that have happened and still happening in Ethiopia.



## **4. POLICY RECOMMENDATION**

As we have seen previously the problems in the Horn of Africa, in this chapter, we will elaborate on what was recommended, and which kind of policy rehabilitation was recommended, to remove these problems.

### **4.1 The African Union**

In Europe to end World War II the Europeans founded the European Union to ensure closer economic, social, and political ties, achieve economic growth, and military security, and promote a lasting reconciliation between the European countries which were in a war (Gabel, 2024). Therefore, the third world also formed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was founded on May 25, 1963, in Addis Abeba (capital of Ethiopia) by Haile Selassie I (Emperor of the Ethiopian Empire 1930-1974) and Kwame Nkrumah, president of Ghana (1957-1966). Their vision was to seek unity and independence for all of Africa.

However, Diedre L. Badejo says in his African Union book that the fifty-three countries that makeup Africa are represented by the African Union (AU), established in 2002. It is the successor organization of the Organization of African Unity. It was established in 1963 to unite African nations to secure and fortify their independence from European powers that had frequently dominated them via colonization for many years. The AU prioritizes democracy, human rights, and economic growth while opposing colonialism, apartheid, and reliance on other nations. The relatively new African Union's primary objective is to increase solidarity and cooperation among its member countries and their citizens to improve living conditions on the continent (Badejo, 2008:12).

The African Union collaborates with member state governments and other international organizations, including the United Nations and the European Union. However, it collaborates on initiatives with non-governmental organizations like International Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders.

The union's main objective was to pursue Westernized democratic policies and freedom of speech and movements. Hence, it became so difficult to implement Western democratic policies in the African governments. We believe the African Union's solution to the African problems was never fully achieved. According to Diedre L. Badejo, "Since 1990, there has been a vast but unsteady trend toward democracy. Although South Africa has seen the most significant transformation, many other countries have taken tentative steps toward democracy, such as implementing free elections, free expression, and basic human rights. The Gambia, Senegal, Botswana, and Mauritius are long-standing democracies; nevertheless, since 1990, more than 20 additional African countries have had genuine elections, resulting in the departure of ruling parties from office. Other countries, such as Zimbabwe, have maintained or restored authoritarian administration. Furthermore, social, and economic progress has proven difficult in some countries where democracy has been established" (Badejo, 2008:21).

Today's political systems range from democracy to centralized power to outright inadequate government and often involve a mixture of the three (Badejo, 2008:21). In 2023, the top three African states ranked by the V-Dem Democracy Index Electoral Democracy metric were South Africa, Cape Verde, and Seychelles (Democracy in Africa, 2024). It means that very few countries have been seen occurring or working on a freedom path.

According to the Freedom Index, states are ranked according to how well their citizen's political and civil liberties, and freedoms, including the right to vote, are protected. The bulk of sub-Saharan African states, including Sudan, Cameroon, and Ethiopia, were classified as not free by the index in 2018, while a few states, including Namibia, Botswana, and Ghana, were declared free ((Democracy in Africa, 2024).

Indeed, democracy is in no way close or enough to be implemented in Africa. Nowadays democracy is related to peace and freedom in the states. So, implementing democratic policies means having more political parties and allowing the freedom of speech, but this is not what African leaders like. They don't like that someone with different political ideas appears in their state and changes the people's closed minds.

As Africans, we only feel that the current president is the finest one that we could have. And that if we try to overcome it, the country will turn into a failed state

similar to Somalia. This was part of a speech made by the president of Egypt Abdel Fatah al-Sisi on January 21, 2024, saying that “Somalia’s troubles began in the 1990s or 91s, and from 1991 to the present, problems, and challenges have destroyed the state's capacities for 30 years. When we communicate with individuals and countries, we tell them to take care of their countries, to keep their stability, and to protect their country. Any issue can be overcome as long as the state is stable and secure. When a country falls into a condition of instability, it cannot readily recover. It might take longer than 30 years” (YouTube, 2024). This message was for the Egyptian people who wanted to overthrow the current president. It can also be interpreted as a direct warning, for those who want to preserve peace and stability in Egypt. Al Sisi is warning to any opposed parties or any other kind of opposition that if they try to start propaganda to overthrow Sisi from the president, the country will end like Somalia. And that he would not let this happen easily. This same speech exists nearly all-around African states and is used by authoritarian regimes to defend and warn their citizens.

Indeed, The African Union started the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to fight against terrorism in Somalia. Therefore, AMISOM's mission was to minimize the danger originating from Al Shabab and other armed opposition organizations. Ensure security for Somalia's political process and reconciliation efforts, and transfer security responsibilities to the Somali National Army (Dr. Williams, 2008:12). AMISOM was deployed to Mogadishu when Al Shabab controlled much of the city and a large portion of south-central Somalia. Fortunately, AMISOM made significant progress in Somalia in early 2007. The AU force drove insurgents out of the capital city in August 2011 and extended its operations. The mission protected two federal governments, two national elections, and two transitional administrations (Dr. Williams, 2008:13).

Somali leaders have been able to address issues with internal governance and reconciliation due to AMISOM. A lack of effective command negatively impacted the AMISOM operations and control over all the assigned forces and assets. The problem worsened when neighboring nations were incorporated into the AMISOM framework. Some troops often followed national interests that did not correspond with AMISOM targets, compromising the mission's legitimacy over some parts of operations (Bruton, and Williams, 2014:82).

Unfortunately, the Somali federal leaders were unable to prioritize the defeat of Al Shabab or to engage in a political dialogue. Because Al Shabab would never accept a reconciliation dialogue with the federal state as we talked about in the previous chapter. Today, the attacks made by Al Shabab in Somalia have become an ordinary case for the people of Somalia. Though it was less dangerous in the last two years, we don't mean that Al Shabab is a harmless organization.

In sum, the AU partially achieved a narrower goal than they aimed. On one hand, Somalian leaders did not prioritize the elimination of Al Shabab. On the other hand, the AMISOM troops were not one hundred percent effective and loyal in their operation. This was the first attempt to neutralize Al Shabab from Somalia. For instance, the AMISOM mission was not the only mission to fight against terror in East Africa, especially in Somalia. The United Nations also engaged in a mission to Somalia to restore peace because the only problem in the Horn of Africa was Al Shabab. In the coming part, we will discuss the UN mission in Somalia.

#### **4.2 United Nations and Somalia**

The UN was founded in 1945 to ensure international peace and security. It was accomplished by striving to avert conflict, assisting conflicting parties in reaching an agreement, sending peacekeeping forces, and establishing circumstances for harmony to last and thrive (United Nations, 2024). Kidist Mulugeta noted in his article that, “The background story of the UN's engagement in Somalia is exceedingly complicated, leaving an image of distrust between Somalis and foreign allies. Throughout Somalia, the UN is widely perceived negatively. Following the fall of the Siad Barre leadership in 1991, the UN sent two peacekeeping troops, UNSOM I and UNSOM II. After 18 US marines were murdered, UN peacekeepers left Somalia without restoring peace and security”. This failure has significantly impacted the UN's position in Somalia. The choice of never deploying a peacekeeping force is still heavily influenced by the Blue Helmets' early 1990s failure. In the early 1990s, the UN attempted to finance a peace conference but failed to achieve any real results. Following this, the UN's involvement in Somalia was limited to providing humanitarian aid (Mulugeta, 2009: 47-48). Therefore, deploying a United Nations peacekeeping mission is an extremely risky alternative. Till today, the only job of the UN in Somalia has been humanitarian aid.

### **4.3 The Role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in The Horn of Africa**

IGAD is a regional African organization with eight member countries from the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and the River Nile. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda are among the member nations. Eritrea has also been suspended since 2007.

IGAD was founded in 1986 to foster integration and cooperation among its member nations, in the region. One of IGAD's key goals is to resolve regional disputes and support harmony and security in the Horn of Africa and adjacent areas. It has also participated in negotiation and peacekeeping operations in Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Eritrea (IGAD, 2024).

IGAD's Security and Peacemaking Program is divided into three sub-programs: Conflict prevention, management, and resolution, Human Affairs, and Political Affairs, which address the critical factor that has increasingly come to characterize the area, namely conflict. However, its effectiveness is limited. In other circumstances, such as the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea or the border crisis between Djibouti and Eritrea, IGAD could not intervene (Kidane, and Redie, 2012: 179).

The resolution of the border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea is cited as follows in Wikipedia:

- On June 24, 2008, the UN Security Council convened a meeting to examine the situation between Djibouti and Eritrea, inviting the Prime Minister of Djibouti and the Eritrean ambassador to deliver comments. After their comments, a UN Fact-Finding team was deployed to evaluate the situation, but Eritrea denied them access.
- On January 14, 2009, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1862, which calls for a peaceful dialogue between Djibouti and Eritrea and a withdrawal of the military in the areas of dispute. Djibouti withdrew their military, while Eritrea was asked to do the same within five weeks, which Eritrea refused. The Security Council applies sanctions on Eritrea, such as travel restrictions and a freeze on the assets of its political and military leaders.

- In early June 2010, Djibouti and Eritrea agreed to refer the matter to Qatar for mediation, which was welcomed by the African Union. In March 2016, eight years after the battle had ended, Eritrea liberated four Djiboutian prisoners of war held during the border war.

Following the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, Qatar removed its peacekeeping personnel from the disputed region. Djibouti then accused Eritrea of reoccupying the mainland hill and Doumeira Island. In September 2018, it was revealed that Djibouti and Eritrea have decided to reestablish ties (Wikipedia, February 15, 2024).

Indeed, the AU, IGAD, and the UN Security Council could not resolve the conflict, which proves the inefficacy of these organizations. The problem of Africa has historically been viewed as a societal challenge, with a lack of sustainable development, struggling economies, and corrupt leaders. Nowadays, this image is far from that of today's Africa, where the continent's economic development rate has hovered around 5% for the past three years (Greg, and Jeffrey, 2007: 40-45).

## 5. CONCLUSION

Pursuing peace and security in the Horn of Africa is a complicated and varied undertaking characterized by ongoing obstacles, historical conflicts, and shifting dynamics. As we have seen throughout the developments, the region's drive for stability is influenced by various issues. In general, political and ethnic differences, external pressures, socioeconomic inequality, and terrorism have limited access to peace in the region. In part, the influence of Ottoman, Italian, and French colonialism on nations such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, which have faced border conflicts, territory annexation, and cultural assimilation, has limited access to peace in the Horn of Africa.

However, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti have had difficulties in establishing autonomy and achieving freedom from the colonies, such as the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1896, Ethiopia's resistance to Italian control, and Djibouti's march to independence from French colonial authority in 1977. Even after their independence, the Horn of Africa had various obstacles, especially border conflicts, domestic wars, political unrest, and lack of economic growth. Eritrea's post-independence troubles are marked by a lack of democracy, human rights violations, and economic stagnation, which illustrates the region's more considerable challenges.

We emphasized the historical backdrop of wars, such as the Ethiopian-Somali Border War (1964-1978), with a particular focus on the Ogaden War, revealing the underlying concerns caused by boundary disputes and nationalist goals. This focuses on how foreign interventions, such as British imperialism and Cold War politics, heightened tensions and fostered regional military conflicts. In addition to that, ethnic conflicts led to an unstable geopolitical situation in the Horn of Africa. While the area has substantial peace and security difficulties, attempts to resolve conflicts, engage in diplomatic discussions, and promote regional cooperation provide glimpses of a more peaceful future.

However, studying the political evolution of countries such as Eritrea demonstrates how authoritarian governments and internal power struggles lead to

instability and impede democratic administration. This examines Eritrea's harsh political system, led by the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), illustrating how dictatorship and control over civil society worsen social and economic issues.

The insecurity of the Horn of Africa is also affected by Somalia's state failure which has resulted in widespread insecurity within and without its boundaries. The lack of a functioning administration for almost 16 years facilitated the rise of groups such as Al Shabab and rampant piracy off its coast. Piracy, which has historically been associated with poverty and a lack of opportunities, skyrocketed in Somalia following the Ogadenian War and the ouster of Siad Barre. Between 2005 and 2008 alone, Somali pirates hijacked over 230 ships and took 537 crew members hostage.

The situation reflects Somalia's continuous troubles, with internal strife, terrorist groups, and piracy endangering regional stability. Despite efforts by international coalitions and organizations including as NATO and the EU to combat these threats, Somalia remains a fragile state with ongoing political and security issues, notably the unsolved question of power-sharing between federal and autonomous governments.

Furthermore, the issue of state disintegration, as demonstrated by the instance of Somaliland's struggle for recognition and its complex relationship with the Federal Somali State, illustrates the issues of statehood and sovereignty in the Horn of Africa, which are characterized by territorial conflicts, ethnic breaks down, and geopolitical rivalry. Concerns for peace and security are raised by the instability caused by tribalism and clan-based conflicts in countries like Ethiopia and Somalia. Long-term peace and stability in the Horn of Africa will require addressing these problems in a multifaceted way that prioritizes community involvement, socioeconomic progress, and governmental reforms.

The case study of tribalism in Ethiopia demonstrates the intricate interplay of ethnic variety, historical processes, and political power struggles in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, with its complex ethnic terrain, has struggled with long-standing conflicts and concerns over how power should be distributed among its numerous ethnic groups. The ascension of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the following political changes represented a turning point in Ethiopian history, bringing in a new era of inclusion and togetherness. Unfortunately, these changes sparked tensions and

disputes, notably with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), resulting in a terrible civil war characterized by massive human rights violations, displacement, and hunger.

The crisis in Ethiopia serves as a sharp reminder of the dangers of ethnic division, and the critical need for inclusive administration and nonviolent discussion to resolve underlying grievances and create a more stable and prosperous future for the region. Looking upward, Ethiopian authorities and stakeholders must emphasize reconciliation, encourage interethnic discussion, and endeavor to establish inclusive democratic institutions that respect all people's rights and aspirations. Ethiopia can only transcend its tribal past and establish a road to long-term peace and security in the Horn of Africa by making sincere efforts toward unification, reconciliation, and respect for variety.

The last security problem in the Horn of Africa is Al-Shabab, a terrorist organization founded in Somalia in the early 2000s, which has since become one of the most visible extremist groups in the Horn of Africa. Al Shabab still controls some parts of Somalia and carries out numerous assaults, including suicide bombings, assassinations, and other types of violence against citizens, government institutions, and foreign targets. Al-Shabaab's philosophy is based on an extreme interpretation of Islam, and its ultimate objective is to establish an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law in Somalia. The criminal organization has also launched strikes in neighboring nations, posing a serious danger to regional stability and security. Terrorism has had a considerable influence on Kenya during the last decade, with a rise in assaults against both international and internal targets.

Due to Kenya's proximity to Somalia and involvement in regional security operations, the nation has become an easy target for extremist groups like Al Shabab. For instance, the horrifying attacks on the Westgate Shopping Mall in 2013 and the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 serve as stark reminders of the persistent threat that terrorism poses to Kenya.

At least some organizations like the IGAD and the AU played a crucial role in establishing peace and security in the Horn of Africa, but limitations and challenges have marked them. Nowadays, Djibouti has access to total security and sovereignty, whereas Ethiopia has some political unrest between the tribes. Unfortunately, the sovereignty of Somalia remains an answered question. Somalia and Somaliland

authorities could not agree on forming one federal government, and it is impossible to agree because Somaliland authorities work hard to achieve recognition, and for them, it doesn't matter if it takes more than decades.

The Horn of Africa leaders must sacrifice their efforts for peace and democracy, otherwise, the situation will remain as it is today forever.



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### **The Interviews**

- Hared, Djama (June 15, 2005). Former Office de la Voirie de Djibouti worker, Balbala, Interviewed by author
- Tahlil, Anas (July 25, 2022). Student in political science, Interviewed by author

## RESUME

General Degree

Sep 2015

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Balbala High School

My High School studies were based on the Science of Economy.

### **Undergraduate Degree**

Turkey/Kahramanmaras/Onikisubat

Sep 2018

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I studied political science and international relations during my undergraduate studies.

### **Master's degree**

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I continue my career in Master of Political Science and International Relations with thesis at Gedik University

### **Skills**

- Teamwork
- Problem-Solving
- Research

### **Languages**

**French:** Native.

**English:** Advanced.

**Arabic:** Intermediate.

**Turkish:** Advanced.

**Somali:** Advanced.