7

A Comparative Analysis of the Post–Arab Uprisings Period in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya

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The uprisings that began in Tunisia in late 2010 quickly spread to other Middle Eastern countries. The emphasis during these protests was socio-economic and political inequality. The crony capitalist policies of long-standing authoritarian regimes in these countries, which deprived the majority of people of political participation and access to economic opportunities, fueled people's grievances. Following the manifestation of large-scale protests, first Tunisian leader Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and then Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak had to relinquish power. As for the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, he was killed when protesters lynched him following NATO's intervention. This wave of uprisings also affected other countries that remain out of the scope of this chapter. For instance, in Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh had to resign due to intensifying protests. While uprisings were violently oppressed in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, they caused a civil war in Syria.

This chapter will try to examine the political repercussions of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya with a comparative perspective. It will focus on the role of distrust among actors, individual/political freedoms, and women/minority issues in theory and practice in these countries. By doing so, this study aims to explore the effects of these political changes on human security in these countries. This chapter argues that whatever their initial purpose, political actors' feelings of insecurity pave the way for authoritarian practices in these countries. The more authoritarian tendencies increase, the more human insecurities increase in these countries. Thus, in general, the post-uprisings period could not change human security conditions in a positive manner.

Concept of "human security"

The concept of human security first drew attention when it was used in 1994 in the Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme. This report focused on the fact that human security is used in a narrow sense as the defense of a homeland or territory from external threats or attacks and that such an approach ignores ordinary people seeking security in everyday life (Paris, 2001, p. 89).

This narrow interpretation of the traditional security approach is a repercussion of the Westphalian system prevailing since the 17th century, which accepts that the international system is composed of nation-states and that these nation-states constitute the only authority that is exempted from any intervention in their internal affairs. Within this framework, security is understood as state security, and the agent that provides security is the state itself via its security mechanism, including the police, soldiers, etc. Security is thus interpreted as a defense of national interests, which are repercussions of dominance under the realist paradigm. Both traditional realists and neo-realists focus on state security and their survival in an "anarchical world." To this end, states should try to promote their security and national interests. Security for states means immunity to external threats (Nuruzzaman, 2013, p. 53). However, this state-centered and top-down security approach is challenged by the appearance of new agents such as social groups, NGOs and communities, as well as by the appearance of new threats without borders, such as mass refugee movements, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, human trafficking, fragile information systems, corruption and fair trials following the end of the Cold War (Paris, 2001, p. 97).

A new approach based on human security presents a challenge to this top-down security approach. This new vision of security, which aims to expand the limits of the security concept beyond the defense of the nation-state against military threats, is regarded as human-centered and universal (Inglehart and Norris, 2012, p. 74). It is possible to describe human security as a concept related to the security of individuals and communities (Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, 2007, p. 273), despite the lack of consensus over its definition. Although definitions of human security vary in scope, their common point is the individual rather than the state. This concept refers to the humanization of security, which makes security people-centered. It comprises "freedom from fear," "freedom from want" and "freedom to live in dignity." Therefore, it requires something very different than a state-centered approach does. It focuses on different actors such as individuals, social groups and local communities

(Inglehart and Norris, 2012, p. 74). Based on such a vision of human security, this chapter attempts to address the security conditions of these groups in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

Regarding the scope of the human security concept, there are two visions in studies related to human security in the Middle East. While some regard the individual as the central point of human security, others consider state security and human security as complementary concepts. Human security is regarded as an instrument to achieve state security. Moreover, while some studies expand its scope – thereby rejecting its restriction to military dimensions – others narrow the concept. According to a broad conception, human security depends on liberation from fear and respect for human dignity. On the contrary, the narrow conception reduces human security to freedom from want. Nevertheless, both categories accept interdependence and complementarity among the economic, social and political dimensions of human security (AHDR, 2009, p. 23).

Based on an approach regarding the individual as the focal point of human security and on a broad conception of human security, this chapter maintains that the authoritarian state and authoritarian tendencies of political actors are the source of the greatest threats to human security in the region. It argues that achieving human security will transform the authoritarian state into one that respects the rule of law. On this basis, this chapter will try to explore human security conditions in the post–Arab uprising period in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya by investigating the role of political actors, individual/political freedoms and women's and minority rights in these countries.

Distrust among actors

In Tunisia and Egypt, distrust amid actors has always existed – before and after the uprisings. On the one hand, Islamists feel insecure regarding secularists because they fear being excluded and oppressed by their politics. On the other hand, secularists fuel fear with respect to the intentions of Islamists. Secularists believe that Islamists aim to create an Islamic state and implement Sharia (Islamic jurisprudence) law. Therefore, they too always feel insecure and fear being oppressed by such Islamist policies. Nevertheless, unifying around a common cause during the uprisings temporarily obscured such feelings of insecurity among the actors because they all wanted the authoritarian leaders in their country to be ousted. In Libya, the situation is not different from that in Tunisia and Egypt. Although the uprisings saw many various religious, regional

and ethnic groups unite around a common aim to topple the Gaddafi regime, the post-Gaddafi period has revealed the tensions and conflictive framework among actors in the country (Sawani and Pack, 2013, p. 523).

Since the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the Gaddafi regime in Libya were all authoritarian in nature, feelings of insecurity were common among the regimes' opponents. Although the Ben Ali administration had promised to carry out reforms at the end of the 1980s in Tunisia, the regime was becoming more authoritarian than ever and was gaining a neo-patrimonial character over time. The expanded family of Ben Ali had control over many firms. Within this context, there was tolerance only vis-à-vis those they considered to be the moderate opposition. Islamist and secular opponents were exiled. Any activities of the opposition groups were suppressed by a powerful police force (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013, p. 8). The Mubarak regime in Egypt was no different from the Tunisian regime in this respect. The opponents were suppressed by the emergency law, which paved the way for torture and other types of ill treatment. The regime cooperated directly with the military, and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) was dominant in almost all areas from economics to politics. Unlike Tunisia, the government allowed members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the main Islamist opposition group in Egypt, to participate in elections as independent candidates in order to divide Islamists. Nevertheless, more radical groups were being suppressed by the administration. While implementing such policies, the regime presented itself as the only bulwark against the Islamist threat (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013, pp. 12–13). For the Gaddafi regime in Libya, a similar situation existed, but not to the same extent. Muammar Gaddafi, who was in power since 1969, was to be succeeded by his son after his death. The notion of patrimonialism and hereditary succession in the private and public sectors existed in Libya as well. Nevertheless, there tribal loyalties were also significant with respect to both private-sector jobs and public posts (Zguric, 2012, p. 423). Accordingly, it is possible to say that the long-standing authoritarian leaders, the significant role of the military in politics and society, the existence of an oppressed civil society and crony capitalism constituted the common points in these three countries before they experienced regime change (Zguric, 2012, p. 419). Therefore, insecurities for the majority of people, particularly for the opposition in these three countries, were high. Islamist and leftist groups were all suppressed, perceived and represented as crucial threats.

In the 21st century, however, because these regimes could not provide solutions to the economic and political demands of their people, many of the Middle Eastern states began to face an economic, political and social crisis. Their legitimacy became more and more questionable. To overcome this crisis of legitimacy, the government allowed political participation by suppressed Islamist groups because their popular support had expanded over time. Two conditions would have ensured success: while the authoritarian regimes were opening politics for Islamists, Islamists should have moderated their discourse and should have tried to integrate into the existing system. In fact, this moderation of discourse for the Islamists had already been in question since the late 1990s. Concepts such as "moderate Islam," "liberal Islam" and "post-Islamism," which imply a more secular attitude vis-à-vis religion, began to be used in this time (Bayat, 1996). The West supported this post-Islamism, based on the pragmatic transformation of the Islamist movements . This new approach toward Islamism highlighted good relations with the West along with the adoption of democratic principles in politics and of free market principles in economy. With regard to religion, it was important to moderate some demands or to give up some of them to follow a policy based on democracy and human rights instead. Therefore, the important and powerful part of the Islamist movements in the Middle East either began to moderate their religious discourse or seemed to be transformed.

Nevertheless, this situation did not change the perception of those who supported democracy, liberalism or more egalitarian and liberal regimes in these countries. They always regarded Islamist movements as threats to their existence. This distrust of Islamist movements has also become salient in the post-uprising period in Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, the Islamist Ennahda Party is a cause of concern for secular parties, while the MB is attracting attention in Egypt in this respect.

Following the uprisings in Tunisia that resulted in the removal of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from power in January 2011, Islamist movements and parties have become salient actors who want to be active in politics. They thus had to make clear their position vis-à-vis the secular opposition. Because of the suppression they faced, Islamist movements long had to exist underground. Islamism was treated as a security issue. In this context, it was the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the police that organized and managed religious activities. But because the police was disbanded and the functioning of the ministry stopped after the collapse of the Ben Ali regime, this situation had to change. Therefore, Islam has become salient and active in the public arena as the mechanism managing religious affairs collapsed.

In this new era, the salience of the religious symbols has increased as a development fueling feelings of insecurity toward Islamist movements. Religious dress and styles have become visible in everyday life. The number of mosques has increased. Religious foundations and associations have become very active by organizing scholarships, sponsorships during the religious festivals and food delivery for poor people. With respect to education, religious schools at every level have become widespread. Whereas memorization of the Qur'an was the only type of Islamic teaching tolerated by the state during the Ben Ali period, following the regime change there has been a variety of ways to teach Islam (Donker, 2013, pp. 207–211).

Given such an atmosphere, an Islamist–secular confrontation emerged before Tunisia's October 2011 elections when a film named *Persepolis* was shown on television. Telling the story of an Iranian girl whose life changes following Iran's Islamic revolution, the film was regarded by Islamists as offensive to Islam. Thousands of people marched and attacked the television station.[1] This event might be interpreted as a manifestation of the struggle between two visions of Tunisia, revealing that the actors still lack tolerance. While such protests fueled fears among secularists, Islamists reacted to what they saw as secularists wanting to destroy the Islamic identity of the state. These protests comprised diverse Islamist tendencies, which were supposed to have political or other aims.

Nevertheless, in Tunisia, the Ennahda movement has been the most prominent participant among the Islamist movements that have taken a political stance or have political aims. The Ennahda Party manifested itself as a moderate Islamist movement, making statements in favor of democracy and human rights. During the campaign prior to the October 2011 elections, the party declared its loyalty to these principles.

Other Islamist movements also have political aims in Tunisia. However, their discourse reveals opposition to the existence of a democratic state. One of these movements, Hizb al-Tahrir (the Liberation party), declares the restoration of the caliphate to be its aim. Party members state that they would construct an Islamic state if they obtained a majority in parliament. This party has been active with protests in various cities, and their prayer organized in Tunis in April 2011 saw a large turnout. Their subsequent activities, however, were not very successful and have had little political significance. According to surveys, this party enjoys popular support of only 2%. Another prominent Islamist party is the Jabhat al-Islah (The Reform Front), which declares its aim to make Sharia rules dominant over all parts of life. Because it did not have formal recognition before the last election, its candidates had to run as

independents. Nevertheless, under the Ennahda government, this party, which openly defends the application of Sharia rules, received formal recognition (Donker, 2013, p. 213). As such, in the post-uprising period in Tunisia, where radical Islamist movements are so active and significant and intolerance against opponents is so widespread, it would be unrealistic to say that a post-Islamist period has begun in Tunisia.

As for Egypt, in the post-Mubarak period, the MB was officially recognized. Like Ennahda in Tunisia, this movement has become a political party under the name Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and obtained a majority in parliament. Despite this electoral success, MB distrust toward non-Islamist parties has increased because the interim military-controlled government was too cautious to support a parliament composed of the Islamist majority. The MB used a moderated discourse during the 2011 electoral campaign in reply to the Salafi movement, a newly politicized rival movement using a discourse based on the instauration of Sharia and the caliphate. Despite the moderated discourse, secularists' feelings of insecurity toward the MB increased because the movement eliminated the less conservative and liberal parts from the party. Within the party, the orthodox part has become significant. The MB therefore revealed its commitment to majoritarian democracy rather than liberal democracy. Because they always considered pluralism a source of division in society, they opted to blame the Christian and secular parts for trying to subvert legitimate elections via undemocratic means (Pahwa, 2013, p. 201).

The distrust of the MB felt by secularists increased more than ever in response to the attitude revealed by the MB during FJP presidential candidate Mohammed Morsi's election campaign in the summer of 2012. In this context, conservative preachers declared that Morsi would restore the caliphate and implement Sharia. They used the photos and names of many Salafi shaykhs in their electoral banners. Morsi himself stated that the Qur'an was their constitution and would always be a constitution for them. He added that Sharia should have been implemented right away (Pahwa, 2013, p. 201). This type of explanation was in direct conflict with the party's other statement, which was based on the instauration of the civil state. As such, secular parts of the society interpreted the situation as if the MB had accepted and confirmed that it would construct an Islamic state based on Sharia rules.

To comprehend this level of distrust among actors in Tunisia and Egypt, one should not ignore the impact of past experiences. Because authoritarianism in these countries was "non-competitive authoritarianism," the opposition did not have the opportunity to organize

independently. Thus, there were only weak opposition movements in politics. Tunisia and Egypt both functioned like police states. Opposition movements were under the control of a powerful Ministry of Internal Affairs (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013, p. 5). As such, both in Tunisia and Egypt, the parties that did not have a democratic past always inspired distrust and fear in each other. They could only cooperate during the period of uprising. After the collapse of the former regimes, their reciprocal distrust increased before the new period based on uncertainty regarding regime type.

With regard to the actors in Libya, following the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, Islamist movements declared their aim to establish an Islamic state. Although the Salafists underline the paradox between democracy and their movement, none of the Islamist movements openly refused democracy because they considered it a means to realize their ultimate goals (Sawani, 2012, p. 5). As for the MB in Libya, this movement is better organized than other Islamist movements. They consider democracy a means to be used and declare that they are not opposed to a civil state unless the priority of Sharia changes in the law. Nevertheless, they refuse a call for secularism. As in Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamist movements are the best organized actors in Libya. These actors also try to insert Islamism as a political attitude into the minds of people. Based on criticism of the previous regime and their loyalty to Islamist values, they attempt to increase their popular support (Sawani, 2012, p. 6).

As for the liberal, nationalist and leftist parts of the political sphere, there are no well-organized groups in Libya. Representatives of these currents defend the establishment of a civil state, and they oppose religious control over society. They believe that Islamists conceal their real intention and pretend to be democratic. They assert that Islamists will use democracy as a means to be put in power and that they will destroy the democratic system when they come to power. Because they are not well organized at the bottom level, these secular groups cannot be effective currents in the politics of Libya. It is noteworthy that, as in Tunisia and Egypt, polarization and distrust among Libyan actors is very explicit. This situation is especially revealed in political assassinations. In terms of violence, the Islamic Movement for Change has risen to prominence among the extremist Islamist groups.

Moreover, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the uprisings against the Gaddafi regime in Libya revealed various tribal and local fanaticisms. Tribalism is more significant in Libya, especially in the eastern part of the country, to such an extent that tribalism in these regions is becoming more important than Islamism. They have become active

in the post-Gaddafi period. Many tribal conferences were held in these regions in order to be influential during the establishment of a new regime in the country. These conferences saw a call to reject centralism regarding Libya's administration in the new period. During a meeting in October 2012, a tendency toward federalism appeared. However, it is noteworthy that the organization of tribes attracts a reaction by some Islamist movements. Within this framework, Islamists' assassination of Abd al-Fattah Yunis from the al-Abidat tribe, one of the most influential tribes in eastern Libya, is important. This murder was condemned during the last conference in October 2012. The slow functioning of the judiciary related to such events carries the potential to increase violent attacks among actors (Sawani, 2012, p. 7).

Nevertheless, in the region of Misratah, the situation is different because there is a connection between the local people and Islamists. They both defend the fact that some liberal leaders in the National Transitional Council (NTC), which was established on 2 March 2011 to conduct the transitional phase in Libya, and the interim government are banned from politics. In addition, the people of Misratah demand that the people of Tawergah be displaced because they committed many acts – such as killings, rapes of women, theft and robbery – against the Misratah people (Sawani, 2012, p. 8). Such events provoke conflict in Libya and cause further polarization among actors by increasing insecurity.

In the western mountain region of Libya, there is a division between Arabs and Amazigh (Berber) people. In the first stage of the uprisings, there was an increasing manifestation of rupture and Gaddafi tried to profit from this situation to render the uprisings unsuccessful. However, during this period, this rupture did not transform into a conflict. Nevertheless, because the Arab tribes of al-Zintan increased their arming process, Amazigh tribes followed them with all types of weapons. This development changed the situation (Sawani, 2012, p. 8).

Also in the western mountain area, the Mashasha and other tribes face large problems of insecurity. Some towns and villages are completely evacuated. Because they are labeled as Gaddafi loyalists, they cannot return to their home for fear of persecution (Sawani, 2012, p. 8). Therefore, the problem of displaced people is very important in this region, paving the way for serious human insecurity. This situation has a negative impact on the perceptions of security and people's conditions because the basic citizenship rights and freedoms of these people are being violated. All of these aspects and developments fueling distrust among actors have a potential to worsen the conflict situation in Libya.

It can be seen that Tunisia, Egypt and Libya face serious polarization among their domestic actors, which causes people to feel insecure. It is important to analyze which consequences this distrust produces in practice by comparing individual and political freedoms and women's and minority rights in theory and practice within these three countries.

Individual and political freedoms: in theory and in practice

The actors discussed so far have had different demands regarding individual and political rights. As such, distrust among actors is revealed both in practice and in the constitutional debates. This situation prevented the construction of an environment in which actors feel security in relation to one another, thus guaranteeing their survival.

Because there has been no reconciliation among actors in Egypt, the MB and secular opposition members have competed to affect the temporary government formed by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), which conducted the regime-change process in the country. However, the SCAF administration, unlike in Tunisia, did not implement any institutional reform and did nothing to remove the crony capitalism of the Mubarak period. Following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the MB, which was revealed as the most powerful actor, did not make an effort to democratize. With an implicit collaboration with the SCAF, the MB excluded secular parts of the society in the commission that had been composed to write the new draft constitution. A package of constitutional reforms, aimed at paving the way for new elections, produced by this commission was approved by referendum in March 2011. According to this declaration, the new constitution would be written by a constitutional assembly selected by parliament but following the parliamentary elections, in which the MB was expected to win (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013, pp. 13–14). These steps were regarded as signs of authoritarianism rather than democratization.

After the parliamentary elections that took place in January 2012, Islamist parties emerged as winners. The MB's FJP won the largest number of seats, while the Salafist al-Nour Party came in second.[2] The MB chose not to collaborate with secular, liberal and leftist parts, which obtained only 16% of the seats. In fact, during anti-SCAF protests in January 2012, the MB members said, "the army and the people are one hand."[3]

The constitutional assembly, a semi-legislative structure in charge of drafting and approving a new constitution, was elected by an Islamist-

dominated parliament and did not include diversity. The 25 non-Islamist members of this assembly, which had a majority composed of Islamist members, demitted in protest of this structure. The secular and liberal parts criticized this commission' deliberations by undermining the state's secular character (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013, pp. 15–16). In June 2012, MB candidate Mohammed Morsi won the presidential elections. Following this process, the activities of the MB revealed that it had tried to consolidate all power in its hands as it did not dismantle the old institutions. Moreover, Morsi issued a decree causing popular protests in November 2012. With this decree, Morsi stripped the judiciary of the right to challenge his decisions. Therefore, Morsi consolidated all powers until the proclamation of a new constitution and strengthened the presidency beyond the dispositions of the 1971 constitution (Kienle, 2012, p. 537).

The draft constitution was prepared by the Islamist MB- and Salafist-dominated constituent assembly in December 2012. The MB demanded that Sharia – which is defined as a frame of reference that guides faith, morality and worship – serve as the basis of national values. In this context, Sharia law organizes the life not only of Muslims but also of non-Muslims. Based on such a vision, the new constitution was written in Egypt and the public approved it in a referendum by a 63.8% vote and a 32.9% voter turnout. This constitution prompted protest by secular opposition leaders, in particular Christian and women's groups. The secular aspects of society accused the Islamists of writing a constitution that boosts the role of Islam and restricts individual and political rights. They asserted that the new constitution did not represent all citizens and that it only strengthened the MB and ignored the principles of the "revolution." Furthermore, they claimed that the MB had laid a foundation of a religious dictatorship by considering Sharia as a reference point. However, the proponents of the new constitution asserted that the public began to profit from the "revolution" following the new constitution's approval. They accused the secular side of pursuing power and money. Beyond this debate, which was based on strict polarization, UN human rights experts criticized the new constitution by emphasizing the fact that equality and non-discrimination were not guaranteed by the new constitution.[4]

Article 219 of this constitution, which accepted Sharia as the principal source of legislation, allowed extensive implementation of Sharia rules in society. It stipulated that it guaranteed freedom of thought and opinion. However, this constitution did not replace military trials with civilian ones. With regard to presidential power, it presented a regime

composed of a mixture of a presidential and a parliamentary system. It envisaged presidential term limits and restricted the president's ability to declare a state of emergency. Despite the parliament's strengthened ability to dismiss the government, the president continued to retain substantial power via the Shura Council and institutional appointments. Morsi therefore conducted a competitive authoritarianism, which envisages government control over state institutions instead of democracy (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013, p. 17). This authoritarian environment caused protests by secular and liberal parties and increased insecurity by causing violence. In January 2013, more than 50 people were killed during street protests, after which army chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi stated that political strife was pushing the state to the brink of collapse. Nevertheless, Morsi continued to fuel feelings of insecurity in secular and liberal parts of society. In June 2013, he appointed Islamist allies as regional leaders and, most controversially, he appointed a member of a former Islamist armed group that was believed to be linked to a massacre of tourists in Luxor in 1997. This action caused protests, and the Luxor governor resigned.[5]

The new constitutional process conducted by Islamists was seen to recognize only the expectations and demands of some parts of society by ignoring concerns and feelings of insecurity among the secular and liberal aspects. First, life was organized around religious rules. The political representation of different groups remained meaningless because it is hard to talk about the existence of individual and political rights and freedoms when Sharia dominates the judicial area. This situation paved the way for deep polarization and distrust between Islamists and secularists/liberals.

This environment of distrust and insecurity also continued after the military removed the Morsi government in July 2013. However, this time the victims were different. In August 2013, hundreds of protesters, mostly Islamists, were killed by security forces. The MB declared that the total number of dead was 2,200. A state of emergency and curfews were declared, and a court banned the MB from carrying out any activity in Egypt and ordered confiscation of its assets. A new law restricted the right to public protests. In addition, in December 2013, the government declared the MB a terrorist group after a bomb blast in Mansoura.[6] This time Islamists were under pressure and have been removed from politics. This situation reveals that distrust and lack of human security in society, regardless of who is in power, always increase authoritarian practices by removing individual and political freedoms.

Within such an environment of insecurity, in January 2014, Egyptians voted in a referendum on a new constitution drafted following the overthrow of the Islamist-led government. In the new constitution, some changes were made regarding the role of religion in law, the power of the military and individual rights and freedoms. The new constitution's preamble emphasizes the "building of a modern democratic state with a civilian government." Nevertheless, the amended constitution gives the military more powers with a transitional article requiring the approval of the SCAF over the appointment of the defense minister. While the amended constitution kept the second article, indicating that the principles of Sharia are the main source of law, the controversial Article 219 did not take effect despite concerns raised by the Salafist al-Nour Party, the only Islamist member of the panel. Article 51 stipulates that "dignity is the right of every human being and may not be violated; the State shall respect and protect human dignity." There are also new articles giving more rights that are important to ensure human security in the country. Article 52 states that torture in all forms and types is a crime that is not subject to prescription. Article 53 indicates that all citizens are equal before the law: "They are equal in rights, freedoms and general duties, without discrimination based on religion, belief, sex, origin, race, colour, language, disability, social class, political and geographic affiliation or any other reason." Article 55 is also important regarding human security because it stipulates that "every person who is either arrested, detained, or his freedom is restricted shall be treated in a manner that maintains his dignity" (Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014).

Despite some positive statements regarding human security and democracy in the new constitution, in practice, we can say that there are no secure conditions in Egypt. The old constitution adopted under Morsi had been criticized because all parts of society were not included in the drafting process. Nevertheless, the new drafting process under the military authority also excluded the Islamists because there were only two Islamist members on the drafting committee. Moreover, neither of them was from the MB, which constitutes the largest opposition group in Egypt. In addition, only 5% of people could see the draft constitution prior to the referendum, which was considered a test of legitimacy for the military-backed authority (Nashashibi, 2014, p. 22).

The campaigning period for the constitution was also under pressure because campaigning for a no vote was impossible. Campaigning for a no vote or a boycott resulted in arrest, beating or persecution. Transparency International, a Berlin-based anti-corruption organization

that sent observers for the referendum, criticized the repression implemented by state authorities during the referendum period. According to this organization, the government harassed, arrested and persecuted peaceful critics. It became impossible to promote views and debate prior to the vote. Moreover, the government did not prevent violence during the referendum. The security forces were also the cause of much of that violence because they beat, injured and even killed demonstrators (Nashashibi, 2014, p. 23). Such conditions seriously threaten human security because they undermine the right to political representation and participation. This situation fuels distrust and feelings of insecurity among different segments of society. In these conditions, society is divided into three parts: those who support army chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi and the military, supporters of the MB, and those who oppose both. Each feels insecure with respect to the other groups. If things continue as they are, the new constitution will probably not resolve the problems. Under the practice of the police state, human insecurity will likely increase (Nashashibi, 2014, p. 23). According to Amnesty International, Egypt has seen state violence on an "unprecedented scale" since Morsi's ouster.[7]

Political opponents of the military government, particularly MB supporters, have been killed and arrested or held without trial. Many other activists related to the January 2011 uprising are now exposed to security-related charges and face the possibility of being jailed for years or being executed. Local media outlets critical of the government were closed down without warning and their staff arrested. Even foreign journalists were targeted or arrested on the accusation of aiding terrorist organizations (Frykberg, 2014, p. 24). The recent events are striking in terms of revealing the dimensions of the human insecurity in Egypt. The most revealing development is that hundreds of MB supporters have been sentenced to death.[8]

Compared to Egypt and Libya, the post-uprising period in Tunisia has become the most promising one for democratization. Following the overthrow of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, the Ennahda movement, which is in general considered a moderate Islamist movement, won in the parliamentary elections in October 2011 despite the fact that it fell short of an outright majority. Like their MB counterparts in Egypt, Ennahda members had little experience governing a state. The party was banned under the Ben Ali regime while its members spent years in prison or exile. Ennahda led a coalition with two secular parties in trying to draft a new constitution. Nevertheless, Islamists were dominant in key positions in the government. Ennahda ceded power in January 2014

to a caretaker government under pressure because it had been criticized for failing to address terrorism and the economy. The change in government was the result of a negotiation to resolve five months of political deadlock after the assassination of the liberal politician Mohammed Brahmi in July 2013.[9] Since then, Tunisia has been led by a technocrat government. However, Ennahda retains dominance of the assembly.

The National Constituent Assembly worked on the constitution for two years. In the last months, every article of the constitution was debated. During this step, Islamists became more salient than ever with their demands for Islamist education because they had been under pressure during the previous regime (Allani, 2013). Nevertheless, because of the reactions of secularists, they had to renounce any reference to Sharia in the constitution. Other controversial issues such as criminalization of blasphemy were included in the debate and freedom of religious practice was emphasized. However, the article stipulating criminalization of blasphemy was not present in the final text of the constitution.[10]

Compared to Islamists in Egypt, those in Tunisia seemed more motivated because they were completely suppressed under the Ben Ali regime. They agreed with secularists regarding opposition to pro-regime transitional governments. In contrast with those in Egypt, the proponents of the previous regime in Tunisia were not included in the constitutional process (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013, p. 11). The draft constitution had two versions. The first one, prepared by Ennahda, defended the parliamentary system. The second one was supported by secular parties and defended a semi-presidential system. It is noteworthy that both sides opposed a strong presidential system and defended proportional representation for parliamentary elections. Unlike Egypt and Libya, the different groups achieved a common point, emphasizing that power would be dispersed and that the system would force parties to form coalitions (Landolt and Kubicek, 2013, p. 11). In Egypt and Libya, there is no such consensus among different parties regarding the new political system to be constructed.

Article 6 of the Tunisian constitution (adopted in January 2014), which includes two contradictory visions, prompted controversy. In fact, according to this article,

> the state shall protect religion, guarantee freedom of belief and conscience and religious practices, and ensure the impartiality of mosques and places of worship away from partisan instrumentalisation. The state shall commit to spreading the values of moderation and tolerance, and protecting sanctities and preventing attacks on them,

> just as it shall commit to preventing calls of takfeer [calling another Muslim an unbeliever] and incitement to hatred and violence, and to confronting them.[11]

A closer look at this article reveals, on the one hand, that by calling out to Islamists, it considers the state to be the guarantor and protector of everything sacred. On the other hand, it stipulates that everyone has the freedom of religious choice. This article opposes international human rights because the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 stipulates that accusations of defamation of religion cannot be used to limit freedom of expression. However, ambivalent clauses like Article 6 are always used by authorities to avoid critics (Guellali, 2014).

Notwithstanding the constitution, when we look at the practice, there is real human insecurity concretized as violence in Tunisia. Political assassinations have been remarkable in the post-uprising period. The liberal opposition leader, Chokri Belaid, was killed in February 2013. This event led to large protests. Unions called for a general strike alongside his funeral. Lawyers and judges launched a two-day strike. The General Union of Tunisian Workers, the country's largest trade union, called a general strike for one day. However, protesters faced tear gas by security forces.[12] This assassination has increased the ongoing tension between Islamists and secularists/liberals. The secularists and liberals, who accuse the Islamists of consolidating too much power, have regarded the Ennahda government as responsible for this assassination, claims that Ennahda denies.

The assassination of Mohammed Brahmi in July 2013 was the second time in five months that a liberal opposition leader had been killed. This event culminated the political tension in the country. The liberal and secular groups thought Islamist extremists were behind this assassination. They considered this type of event a threat to pluralistic democracy. Hundreds of protesters gathered and blamed the ruling Ennahda party and its supporters for this murder.[13] Although the Ennahda government denied responsibility and condemned the event, this murder fueled feelings of insecurity among the people. Secular and liberal segments of society accuse the government of not being fair and of being inefficient against radical Islamists by giving them the right to act with impunity.

In August 2013, the government declared Ansar Al Sharia, the most radical Islamist group to have emerged in the country since the overthrow of Ben Ali, a terrorist organization, as the government expressed that they had proof that this organization was behind the assassination of two liberal politicians and several soldiers.[14]

In Libya, the National Transitional Council (NTC) established in March 2011 assumed the task of leadership during the entire transitional phase, along with international support. Within this term, a founding assembly would draft a constitution after being elected and form a transitional government to carry out free elections. However, the NTC failed to rule the transitional process on schedule. As such, its critics have been increasing. Moreover, Islamists have become more powerful than ever and have tried to carry out their demands. In August 2011, the NTC issued a Constitutional Proclamation as a guide to establish a new political system. It contains 37 articles defining the state, values upon which it rests, rights, the system of governance through the interim phase and judicial guarantees (Sawani, 2012, p. 9).

Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, there is a large security deficit in Libya. Armed groups, which are increasing over time throughout the country, constitute an obstacle to the establishment of new political authority in Libya (Zoubir and Rozsa, 2012). As such, state structures and political institutions could not be established. Furthermore, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the intervention of foreign actors has become significant in Libya following the beginning of uprisings between security forces and rebels. First, the UN Security Council authorized a no-fly zone over Libya and air strikes to protect rebels against Gaddafi forces. Then, in order to overthrow the Gaddafi regime and to influence the future of the country, some Western states carried out air attacks against Gaddafi forces in March 2011 under the NATO framework (Davidson, 2013). As for the Libyan people, as in Tunisia and Egypt, at first they unified around a common aim, which was overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Nevertheless, after Gaddafi was killed, this unifying point disappeared.

Libya is in a state of chaos three years after the uprisings against the Gaddafi regime.[15] Militias, which made many parts of the country unsafe, continue to enjoy impunity. Some tribes that demand independence are blocking oil exports, and a deputy minister of industry has been shot. The government and parliament are in dispute. The term of the General National Congress (GNC), the name of the transitional parliament, ended in February 2014, but parliamentarians have extended their term of office. Protests erupted in response to the GNC's refusal to disband, and many Libyans have been calling for the dissolution of the parliament, whose deputies they accuse of inefficiency and abusing power. The GNC expressed that it needed to extend its parliamentary term in order to allow a special committee time to draft a new constitution and that new elections would be held as soon as possible. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Libya still has no new constitution. A constitutional

assembly was formed in February 2014 to draft a constitution, but it could not present a draft for a new constitution as of this writing. The discussions over the constitution revolve around three questions: How much power will be given to the regions? What rights will be granted to minorities? To what extent will Sharia be significant?[16]

The political crisis is very serious in Libya compared to Tunisia. The GNC is split into two cross-party camps. While there are the Islamists and revolutionaries who are demanding more influence for religion and former rebels on the one side, there are the liberals and nationalists who defend the status quo and want to decrease the influence of the MB on the other. This division began with the "Isolation Law," which stipulates the exclusion of members of the former regime from the political system. This law was enforced in early 2013 by militias that besieged the parliament building. It is noteworthy that this division threatens political stability and social cohesion in Libya. In fact, politics and military force are intertwined and both sides are using militias to become influential in the future of the country. The commander of the "Qaqaa" (Saber-Rattling) Brigades declared in February 2014 that the GNC was no longer legitimate. He stated that the power should be transferred to the Supreme Court and threatened with detention parliamentarians who did not resign as soon as possible. Another example is forces from the port city of Misrata, who are generally supporters of the Islamists, because they have declared that they would defend parliament and democracy with weapons if it becomes necessary.[17]

Compared to those in Tunisia, political assassinations are more widespread and serious in Libya in the post-uprising period as a result of this sharp political division. It is reported that more than 1,200 people have been killed in the last two years. This split within the GNC, with groups backed by rival militias, has made the appointed government virtually powerless. The city of Benghazi, the birthplace of the Libyan uprising, has been most affected by the attacks. Many prominent figures, judges, security officials and political activists have been killed in two years. In this city, the US ambassador and three other Americans also died in an attack carried out in September 2012. The city includes numerous militias, comprising some extreme Islamist groups who are operating lawlessly. In this insecure environment, some killings are carried out by smuggling and organized crime groups because hundreds of common criminals escaped from jails during the uprising. Political assassinations have become so systematic and widespread that officials, legislators and activists from the region describe them as a concerted campaign to eliminate the building of a modern state.[18]

We have seen that in these three countries, individual and political rights are more or less in danger. Insecurities emerged as violence prevented individual and political rights from being guaranteed. Despite their place in the constitutions, individual and political rights have come under threat in these places where violence dominates by causing important problems regarding human security. This insecure situation with respect to individual and political rights has become significant for women's and minority rights in the three countries as well.

Attitudes toward women and minorities

Women participated extensively in protests in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, demanding democratic change and calling for freedom and dignity. However, during the uprising period, the salience of women in protests and demonstrations bothered existing regimes. As such, they were subjected to different forms of violence. The insecurities regarding women in these three countries emerge as psychological or physical violence. The post-uprising period did not completely cease this violence against women.

According to the Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democrates (ATFD), during the uprising period, police violence was directed toward women in Tunisia. They face all types of violence, including sexual harassment and rape. In the late period of the Ben Ali regime, women were sexually harassed and raped by security forces. Through these means, the government wanted to intimidate them. Nevertheless, following the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, they could not achieve the dignity and freedom they were looking for. They continued to demonstrate for full participation in the transition period. During the protests it was reported that women were attacked by some men, who called for them "to return to their kitchens" (FIDH, 2012, pp. 8–9). Even further, they feel under the threat of Salafists.[19]

As for Egypt, women participated in the protests alongside men, calling for the end of Mubarak's regime and the establishment of a civilian government. In the first days of the uprising, there was no violence against women. However, when the protests against SCAF, which was seen as replicating the practices of the former regime, began and women from various organizations marched toward central Cairo to protest it, the situation changed. Women requested more rights by emphasizing the fact that there was no change in the post-Mubarak period regarding women rights. However, they were attacked by state forces and 19 women were detained. These detained women became

exposed to torture, sexually degrading treatment and virginity tests. Moreover, when they were released, they faced charges because they were accused of being prostitutes. This type of treatment was received by women who demanded some rights in the former regime too, but they could not be heard. In the post-uprising period, the public could be informed about them thanks to social networks (Johansson-Nogues, 2013, p. 400). Moreover, the attack against journalist Lara Logan on the night of Mubarak's resignation and against journalist Caroline Sinz on 23 November 2011 have become examples revealing the scary dimension of violence women face in Egypt. Logan was sexually assaulted by a mob of 40 men in Tahrir Square, and Sinz was sexually assaulted by a group of boys when reporting the news (FIDH, 2012, p. 18). Violence against women was regarded as a deterring instrument and was used against those who were active in the protests in Tunisia and Egypt.

Violence targeted women in Libya too. Women participated actively in the conflict that began following the spark of protests calling for the end of the Gaddafi regime in February 2011. They communicated information from one place to another and smuggled weapons. Some women directly engaged in conflict and chose to fight against Gaddafi forces. Nevertheless, they were subjected to rape by armed men. This was so widespread that, according to the ATFD, Libyan female refugees during the uprising period expressed fear of being raped or sexually harassed as the reason for their escape from Libya. Another remarkable point is that raped women are killed by their family to "restore family honor." Moreover, it has been revealed that some families choose to kill their female members to avoid the risk of rape (FIDH, 2012, pp. 27–28).

Despite differences of degree, women who took part in the uprisings and protests were depicted as mentally ill, drunks or prostitutes. The aim here was to prevent the image of women who participate in the protests and do not obey security forces from being accepted as legitimate. In all three countries, women face insecurity. Nevertheless, women in these countries hoped that they would get rid of sexual violence in the post-uprising period. Along with political, social and legal precautions, they hoped to receive the dignity they have been seeking (Johansson-Nogues, 2013, p. 401).

In Egypt, there is some progress regarding women rights, at least on the constitutional level. The 2012 constitution called women "the sisters of men." Such a conceptualization left women with an unclear status. However, the 2014 constitution clearly stipulates that women are equal to men and that the state is responsible for preventing any violence against women and for providing political representation

of women. This type of statement signifies progress compared to the previous constitution. However, both in the 2012 and 2014 constitutions, family, which is regarded as being based on morality and patriotism, is described as the basis of the society. The 2014 constitution stipulates that the state "ensures women's empowerment to reconcile the duties of a woman toward her family and her work requirements." It can be inferred from this statement that a woman is considered a person in the service of her "sacred family."[20] In addition, as in Tunisia, the electoral law obliged political parties to include women in Egypt's electoral process. However, women hold the lowest positions on electoral lists. When the first Constituent Assembly gathered in the beginning of 2012, there were only six women in a panel of 100 persons. The second Constituent Assembly included more women at first but all of them left the assembly before the drafting process of the constitution ended. They asserted that their demands were not represented in the draft and that they were humiliated. In the Egyptian People Assembly, which was dispersed in 2013, only 12 out of 498 seats belonged to women. According to Egyptian and UN experts, the draft constitution accepted in December 2012 could not prevent discrimination against women and guarantee their rights, which are limited to issues such as marriage age, divorce and legacy. According to women's organizations, sexual harassment exists in the streets regardless of how women dress. In the protests against the MB government, women who participated in demonstrations and who are journalists were exposed to sexual violence (Johansson-Nogues, 2013, p. 402).

In Tunisia, the Islamist Ennahda Party, following its electoral success, at first seemed to be determined to meet the demands of Tunisian women. At the end of the elections, women achieved a 27.2% representation level in the Constituent Assembly. However, they got only three ministers in the 41-member cabinet. The 2012 draft constitution was too ambiguous to provide equality between women and men in economic, social and political areas and to prevent sexual discrimination (FIDH, 2012, pp. 11–12). When we look at the practice, the unity restored between women and men during the uprisings seemed to have disappeared in Tunisia. They are exposed to violence by their relatives or other men because of their dressing, smoking, drinking or behaviors. In addition, it is reported that in various universities, professors and students who do not cover their head are being forced to be veiled, humiliated or exposed to violence (Johansson-Nogues, 2013, p. 401).

As far as the situation in Libya is concerned, Libya has only two ministers in the government. The new electoral law adopted by the NTC in

January 2012 stipulates that 50% of candidates on electoral lists must be women, but the parties are not obliged to place women candidates in the first rung of the lists. According to Article 6 of the Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage adopted by the NTC in August 2011, "Libyans shall be equal before the law. They shall enjoy equal civil and political rights, shall have the same opportunities, and be subject to the same public duties obligations, without discrimination due to religion, belief, race, language, wealth, kinship or political opinion or social status." In this article, there is no reference to sex as a reason for discrimination (FIDH, 2012, pp. 29–32).

Minority groups also face serious human insecurity in these three countries despite differences in the level of that insecurity. The manifestation of insecurity can be seen in forced migration, violence and a lack of basic individual and political rights.

In Libya, the Amazigh (Berbers), Tuareg and Tebu (Toubou) are minorities who were under pressure in the Gaddafi regime. While the Amazigh constitute the largest minority group, Tuareg and Tebu are considered Amazigh-related communities.[21] Following the uprising, the lack of a powerful authority has offered these ethnical groups the opportunity to express their demands. They began to fight for greater recognition in the new period. As already noted, they began to organize conferences where they clarified their problems and demands, thereby revealing that the Amazigh have common demands throughout northern Africa. They demanded that the Amazigh language, known as Tifinagh, should either become the official language or be recognized as one of the national languages. Conferences have become platforms where they advocate and secure their rights. During these conferences, some important figures from the Amazigh requested independence for their ethnic groups. They revealed their opposition to Arabism as well because they were long exposed to an Arab narrative on the country during the Gaddafi government. In this regard, they stated that they are ready to cooperate with Israel (Sawani, 2012, p. 8). Yet their security concerns did not cease in the post-Gaddafi period. According to reports by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), thousands of Amazigh fled from Libya following the conflict. Since the early days of the uprising, organized racist attacks on so-called "Black" Libyans and foreign workers were reported.[22] However, the election of Nuri Abu Sahmein, a member of the Berber minority that suffered discrimination under the Gaddafi regime, as chairman of the GNC[23] can be regarded as progress compared to the previous regime.

In Egypt, minority groups include Copts, Nubians, Bahai and Jews. However, the main minority group is Copts, who are indigenous

Egyptian Christians and who represent 6–9% of the total population. While Sharia law recognizes Copts as "people of the book," other ethnic groups do not face such tolerance.[24]

In the latest period of Mubarak's rule, actions perpetrated against the Copts reached a peak between 2010 and 2011. In January 2010, six Copts were killed on the eve of the Coptic Orthodox Christmas. In November 2010, Coptic Christians clashed with police over construction of a church and one protestor was killed. The most significant incident that led to the conflict between Muslims and Christians was the killing of 21 people in a bomb blast outside a church in January 2011.[25] Following this event, clashes erupted between Copts and Muslims and between Copts and police. These types of events have fueled concerns about the security of Christian minorities, who have demanded legal protections against discrimination.

During the uprising, there was unity among different groups and no apparent hostility against Copts. But the negative attitude toward Copts and other minority groups continued in the post-uprising period as during the Mubarak regime (Henderson, 2005). Minority groups face real insecurities. In the three years following the uprising, it has been reported that almost 100 Copts died from sectarian violence based on conflict between Muslims and Christians in Egypt. In March 2011, a church was burnt, which left 13 people dead and 140 injured. In addition, in an attack in October 2011, 28 people were killed and 212 were injured at a protest organized by Copts.[26] Many attacks were carried out against the property and churches of Copts. A number of Christians regarded the SCAF as responsible for these violent attacks because they thought the SCAF either ignored or actively engaged in these attacks with Islamists. As such, the insecurity of Copts persisted under the presidency of Morsi, and the government failed to protect them. In April 2013, violence between Muslims and Christians erupted, during which four Copts and one Muslim were killed. The government did nothing to either investigate this event or find long-term solutions.[27]

Under these conditions, the draft constitution under the Morsi presidency was boycotted by Copts; they thought there was no change regarding their status and rights compared to what they had under the former constitution. The end of the Morsi government did not result in any change in this regard either; this situation of insecurity has continued since Morsi's removal. Under the military administration, which has replaced the Morsi regime, there have been many attacks on Copts. The attack carried out in October 2013, in which three people were killed and at least nine others were wounded, is notable in this regard. As usual, security forces were seen as responsible for this event and accused

of not preventing the attack.[28] The judge's efforts to justify the latest death sentences against more than 720 alleged rioters – on the grounds that some of the accused were "demons" adherent to Jewish scripture – also reveals the level of enmity against Jews in the country.[29]

When we look at the legal framework, we see that Article 3 of the 2012 constitution stipulated that Sharia is the main source of law. However, it also considered the canon principles of Egyptian Christians and Jews as the main source of law for their personal status, religious affairs and the selection of their spiritual leaders. The same article is also found in the 2014 constitution. Both constitutions have articles declaring that Egyptian law recognizes the autonomy of Christian and Jewish minorities in their internal affairs. But because it is indicated that Islam is the religion of the state and that Arabic is the official language in Article 2, Article 3 is rendered functionless. Despite the fact that the 2014 constitution provides greater rights and freedoms for Copts and other minorities compared to the previous constitution, long-standing discrimination and marginalization faced by minorities in all areas of civic and political life would not change in the short term.

Tunisia's population is more homogeneous than that of Libya and Egypt. Violence against minorities is not so widespread as in Egypt and Libya. The main minority groups are Amazigh, Jews and Bahai. The number of Amazigh in Tunisia is much smaller than in neighboring countries. They are deprived of any rights. The government does not recognize them as an autonomous minority group because it declares that the Amazigh are a part of Arab Muslim culture. Therefore, there are no reliable statistics and it is difficult to assess their situation in the country. Regarding the Bahai community, their worship in public is forbidden. Their gathering in public is not tolerated. As for the Jews, they face many restrictions. As a result of attacks carried out against the Jewish people since the 1980s, the government provides security for their synagogues.[30] Under the Ben Ali regime, human and political rights were not important. Because it had a secularist and pro-Western character, insecurities did not become salient. In the post-uprising period, violence against minorities persists under the government of Ennahda. Salafists, who are ultra-conservative Islamists and who want the introduction of Sharia across Tunisia, attacked targets that they consider un-Islamic, including churches and synagogues, across the country.[31] According to the Tunisian Association to Support Minorities, the government is passive in the face of a rise in incidents of hate speech and acts of vandalism against minorities.[32]

In the preamble of the Constitution of Tunisia adopted in January 2014, the diversity of culture and ethnic groups is not found and the Arab-Islamic identity is referenced. This situation is defended by the parts

of government who say that Tunisia's reference to a religious identity in its constitution is not a new phenomenon because many democratic nations have included religious identities within their constitutions, while guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of their religious communities. Moreover, the Amazigh are not mentioned in the constitution. They are excluded from the constitution[33] and their language is not included in the school curriculum. This situation endangers the future of the Amazigh in Tunisia and risks their alienation.

Concluding remarks

Various actors ranging from women to Islamist groups participated in the protests in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, demanding equality, freedom, justice and democracy. However, since the beginning of the uprisings, they have been facing serious insecurity. The developments in these countries reveal that the removal of former regimes and their authoritarian figure does not guarantee the establishment of a more secure environment for various segments of society.

Although the political situation and balance vary in each country, people who do not hold political power are now confronting violence perpetrated with impunity by radical Islamists, the military or security forces. This situation is related to the fact that those holding political power tend to manipulate their position to ensure their own interests by excluding others from economic and political areas. Such an attitude, leading to polarization in these countries, fuels feelings of insecurity of opponents as well as of their own members. In this context, authoritarianism more or less gains space in every country.

It seems possible to decrease insecurity in these countries by following a human security–based policy. It would be a useful step to begin with an inquiry into insecurity perceptions held by various parts of society. Some measures aimed at providing reconciliation may be adopted. The implementation of such a policy seems to be difficult in the short term in Libya because there is no political authority throughout the country. Nevertheless, Tunisia and Egypt appear to be more convenient environments for this policy.

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